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Buck v. Stephens
15-8049
Ruling Below: Buck v. Stephens, 630 F. App'x 251 (5th Cir. 2015)
Buck was convicted on two counts of capital murder. During the sentencing phase, the state
presented evidence intended to show that Buck would remain dangerous in the future. Busk
called a clinical psychologist (Dr. Walter Quijano) as an expert witness, with the belief that the
expert would testify on his behalf regarding future dangerousness. During cross examination, the
prosecution elicited an affirmation from Quijano that Buck’s race (black) made him more likely
to be dangerous in the future. The prosecution referenced this in closing arguments.
Subsequently, the jury found that Buck was likely to be dangerous in the future, and sentenced
him to death.
Buck filed for a relief from judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).
The district court denied the motion and declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA),
holding that Buck had failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances.” On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit also denied the motion and declined to issue a COA for similar reasoning.
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit imposed an improper and unduly burdensome
Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard when it denied petitioner a COA on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) as the foundation for a motion to reopen judgment and
obtain a merits review, when counsel knowingly presented an “expert” who testified that
petitioner’s race increased the likelihood of future dangerousness, where the issue of future
dangerousness was crucial to the sentencing decision between life in prison or a death sentence.

Duane Edward BUCK, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division, Respondent–Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on August 20, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
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Duane Buck seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, in
which he sought to raise ineffective
assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in seeking
federal habeas corpus relief. Because he has
not shown extraordinary circumstances that
would permit relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), we deny the
application for a COA.

social economics, and substance abuse. For
example, he testified that advanced age and
increased wealth correlated with a decline in
the likelihood of committing future violent
acts. On race, he gave a one-sentence
explanation: “It's a sad commentary that
minorities, Hispanics and black people, are
over represented in the Criminal Justice
System.” That matched a statement included
in Quijano's expert report, which was
introduced as evidence.

I.
This is Buck's third trip to the Fifth Circuit.
More detailed explanations of the facts and
procedural history can be found in Buck v.
Thaler, 345 Fed.Appx. 923 (5th Cir.2009)
(per curiam), and Buck v. Thaler, 452
Fed.Appx. 423 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam).
We recite only what is relevant to this request
for a COA.
In July 1995, Buck murdered his exgirlfriend Debra Gardner and her friend
Kenneth Butler. Buck was arrested at the
scene, and police found the murder weapons
in the trunk of his car. Two witnesses
identified him as the shooter. Buck laughed
during and after the arrest and stated to one
officer that “[t]he bitch got what she
deserved.”

During cross-examination, the prosecution
elicited one more comment on race from
Quijano: Question: “You have determined
that the sex factor, that a male is more violent
than a female because that's just the way it is,
and that the race factor, black, increases the
future dangerousness for various complicated
reasons; is that correct?” Answer: “Yes.”
During closing arguments, the prosecution
referenced Quijano's testimony generally and
specifically noted that he had said that,
although Buck was in the low range for a
probability of committing future violent acts,
the probability did exist. The prosecution did
not reference Buck's race or Quijano's use of
race.

Buck was convicted of capital murder for the
deaths. During the penalty phase, the state
presented evidence that Buck would likely
remain dangerous. That evidence included
his criminal history, his violent conduct, and
his demeanor during and after the arrest.

The jury unanimously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was a probability
Buck would commit criminal acts of violence
that would be a continuing threat to society.
It further found that there were not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to justify a life
sentence. The court sentenced Buck to death,
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
(“TCCA”) affirmed.

Buck called Dr. Walter Quijano, a clinical
psychologist, as an expert witness to testify
regarding future dangerousness. Buck's
lawyer asked Quijano what factors he would
look at to determine whether an inmate would
engage in future acts of violence. Quijano
explained several, including age, sex, race,

Buck filed his first state habeas application in
1997; it contained no IAC claim or any other
challenge based on Quijano's testimony. In
2000, however, the Texas Attorney General
(“AG”) admitted to the Supreme Court in
Saldano v. Texas, that the state had erred in
calling Quijano as a witness and having him
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testify that the defendant's race increased the
likelihood of future dangerousness. Shortly
after the Court vacated and remanded
Saldano on that confession of error, the AG
publicly identified eight other cases
involving racial testimony by Quijano, six of
which the AG said were similar to Saldano's
case; one of those was Buck's. Buck contends
that Texas “promised to concede
constitutional error and waive its procedural
defenses” in his case so that he could get
resentenced without the race-related
testimony.
In 2002, while his first state habeas petition
was pending, Buck filed a second petition
that challenged Quijano's testimony on
several grounds, including IAC. The TCCA
ultimately denied the first habeas petition and
dismissed the second as an abuse of the writ.
In 2004, Buck filed a federal habeas petition
raising a litany of challenges to his sentence,
including IAC. The court denied relief on that
claim because Buck had not raised IAC on
direct appeal or in his original state habeas
petition. He had raised it in his second state
habeas petition, but the TCCA dismissed it as
an abuse of the writ, so it was procedurally
defaulted. Buck sought a COA from this
court on only one issue: “Was he deprived of
due process or equal protection by the
prosecution's reference to testimony from
Buck's own penalty-phase expert witness ...
?” We concluded that the claim was
procedurally barred and meritless.
After the state set an execution date of
September 15, 2011, Buck moved for relief
from the earlier district-court judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6),
claiming that the state's failure to admit error
and waive defenses was extraordinary and
merited relief. The motion also asked for
relief under Rule 60(d)(3), alleging that the
AG had committed fraud on the court.

The district court denied the motion and,
three days later, Buck filed a motion to
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e),
claiming that the AG had made material
misrepresentations and omissions in
opposing the earlier motion for relief. The
court denied that motion as well. We declined
to permit a successive habeas petition or issue
a COA.
The Supreme Court stayed Buck's execution
to consider his petition for writ of certiorari.
It
ultimately
denied
the
petition,
accompanied by a statement respecting that
denial and a dissent.
In 2013, Buck filed another state habeas
petition. The trial court concluded that it was
a subsequent petition and referred it to the
TCCA. While that petition was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler,
holding that Texas's procedural regime
rendered it almost impossible to raise IAC
claims on direct appeal, making the scheme
similar to the one in Martinez v. Ryan. The
Court therefore held that the Martinez
exception applied in Texas: The lack of
effective counsel during initial state
collateral-review proceedings could excuse a
procedural default on an IAC claim.
The TCCA dismissed the petition as an abuse
of the writ. Three judges dissented,
concluding that Buck had made out a
potentially meritorious case of IAC relating
to his attorney's alleged failure adequately to
investigate and present mitigating evidence.
In January 2014, Buck again filed for Rule
60(b)(6) relief from judgment in his federal
habeas case. He focused solely on his IAC
claim, contending that counsel was
ineffective for introducing Quijano and that
his case was sufficiently extraordinary to
justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The district
court denied the motion, holding that Buck's
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case did not have the extraordinary
circumstances required for Rule 60(b)(6). It
also held that Buck had failed to make out an
IAC
claim,
establishing
deficient
performance but not prejudice. Within a
month of that denial, Buck again moved for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6), essentially
disagreeing with the district court's
disposition of the issues. On March 11, 2015,
the district court denied that motion as well
and declined to issue a COA.
II.
To obtain a COA, Buck must make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” On application for a
COA, we engage in “an overview of the
claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits” but do not engage
in “a full consideration of the factual or legal
bases adduced in support of the claims,”
asking only whether the district court's
resolution of the claim “was debatable among
jurists of reason.”
The district court denied the motion for a
procedural reason, namely, Buck's failure to
show extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). We therefore must
deny a COA if Buck fails to establish both (1)
that jurists of reason would find debatable
“whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right” and (2)
that those jurists “would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.”
III.
Regarding the procedural bar, for a Rule
60(b)(6) motion in this posture not to be itself
a successive habeas petition, the litigant
“must not be challenging a prior merits-based
ruling.” Instead, he must be challenging a
previous ruling—such as procedural default

or
a
statute-of-limitations
bar—that
precluded a merits determination. The district
court initially denied Buck's IAC claim
because the TCCA's abuse-of-the-writ
dismissal was an adequate and independent
state ground for denying relief, so Buck's
motion satisfies that requirement.
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Buck
must show “extraordinary circumstances,”
which “will rarely occur in the habeas
context.” There is little guidance as to what
constitutes “extraordinary circumstances,”
but we have recognized that a change in a
decisional law does not qualify, and we have
cited with approval district-court decisions
holding
other
circumstances
not
extraordinary as well, including IAC.
Buck contends that eight equitable factors
from Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, are the
proper means for evaluating a Rule 60(b)
motion in a habeas case. We have declined to
answer whether Seven Elves sets the standard
for a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in habeas
proceedings. We need not answer it now
because Buck has not made out even a
minimal showing that his case is exceptional.
The January 2014 motion contains eleven
facts, reurged in the COA application, that
Buck says make the case extraordinary:
1. Mr. Buck's trial attorney knowingly
presented expert testimony to the sentencing
jury that Mr. Buck's race made him more
likely to be a future danger;
2. Although required to act as gate-keeper to
prevent unreliable expert opinions from
reaching and influencing a jury, the trial court
qualified Dr. Quijano as an expert on
predictions of future dangerousness, allowed
him to present race based opinion testimony
to Mr. Buck's capital sentencing jury, and
admitted Dr. Quijano's excludable hearsay
report linking race to dangerousness;
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3. The trial prosecutor intentionally elicited
Dr. Quijano's testimony that Mr. Buck's race
made him more likely to be a future danger
on cross-examination, vouched for him as an
“expert” in closing, and asked the jury to rely
on Dr. Quijano's testimony to answer the
future dangerousness special issue in the
State's favor;
4. Mr. Buck's state habeas counsel did not
challenge trial counsel's introduction of this
false and offensive testimony—or Texas's
reliance on it—in Mr. Buck's initial state
habeas application;
5. The Texas Attorney General conceded
constitutional error in Mr. Buck's case and
promised to ensure that he received a new
sentencing, but reneged on that promise after
deciding that the introduction of the offensive
testimony was trial counsel's fault;
6. This Court ruled that federal review of Mr.
Buck's trial counsel ineffectiveness claim
was foreclosed by state habeas counsel's
failure to raise and litigate the issue in Mr.
Buck's initial state habeas petition, relying on
Coleman, which has subsequently been
modified by Martinez and Trevino;
7. The Fifth Circuit held Mr. Buck's trial
counsel responsible for the introduction of
Dr. Quijano's testimony linking Mr. Buck's
race to his likelihood of future
dangerousness;
8. Three Supreme Court Justices concluded
that trial counsel was at fault for the
introduction of Dr. Quijano's testimony;
9. Three Judges of the CCA found that
“because [Mr. Buck's] initial habeas counsel
failed to include any claims related to
Quijano's testimony in his original [state
habeas] application, no court, state or federal,
has ever considered the merits of those
claims;”

10. Mr. Buck's case is the only one in which
Texas has broken its promise to waive
procedural defenses and concede error,
leaving Mr. Buck as the only individual in
Texas facing execution without having been
afforded a fair and unbiased sentencing
hearing; and
11. Martinez and Trevino now allow for
federal court review of “substantial”
defaulted
claims
of
trial
counsel
ineffectiveness.
Initial examination of those facts reveals that
they are not extraordinary at all in the habeas
context. Numbers 1–3, 7, and 8 are just
variations on the merits of Buck's IAC claim,
which is at least unremarkable as far as IAC
claims go. Buck's IAC claim is not so
different in kind or degree from other
disagreements over trial strategy between
lawyer and client that it counts as an
exceptional case. Nor are IAC claims as a
class extraordinary under Rule 60(b)(6). The
Court warned in Gonzalez that extraordinary
circumstances will rarely be present in the
habeas context.
The fourth and ninth extraordinary facts
merely point out that Buck's IAC claim was
procedurally defaulted and did not get a
merits determination. That is not an
extraordinary circumstance in the habeas
context; it is the nature of procedural defaults
that many potentially viable claims will never
advance to a merits determination. No jurists
of reason would expand the definition of
“extraordinary” to reach all procedurally
defaulted IAC claims.
The sixth and eleventh facts relate to Buck's
notion that Trevino and Martinez changed the
law regarding procedural defaults in IAC
claims in a way that could have excused his
procedural default. Martinez, however, “was
simply a change in decisional law” that is not
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an extraordinary circumstance under Rule
60(b)(6), and “Trevino's recent application of
Martinez to Texas cases does not change that
conclusion in any way.”
Those facts plainly fail to make even a
plausible argument that Buck's is the
extraordinary case that satisfies Rule
60(b)(6). He has repeatedly asserted,
however, that his case is special because of
the Saldano-related statements by the AG.
Buck contends the AG conceded that
Quijano's testimony was unconstitutional but
reneged on a promise to resentence Buck
(fact five), despite Texas's following through
in other cases involving Quijano (fact ten).
Even if the AG initially indicated to Buck that
he would be resentenced—a fact that has
never been adequately established—his
decision not to follow through is not
extraordinary. The broken-promise element
to this case makes it odd and factually
unusual, but extraordinary circumstances are
not merely found on the spectrum of common
circumstances to unique circumstances. And

they must be extraordinary circumstances
“justifying relief from the judgment.” Buck
has not shown why the alleged reneging
would justify relief from the judgment. For
example, he has not shown that he relied on
the alleged promise to his detriment.
Nor is it extraordinary that the AG confessed
error and waived procedural bars in other
cases and not in Buck's. We have previously
rejected the notion that some concept of
“intra-court comity” requires the state to
waive procedural defenses in similar cases.
Even assuming arguendo that the other cases
at issue are materially similar to Buck's
(which the state disputes), it can hardly be
extraordinary that the state chose different
litigation strategies between the two cases.
Jurists of reason would not debate that Buck
has
failed
to
show
extraordinary
circumstances justifying relief.
Buck has not demonstrated that jurists of
reason would debate whether his case is
exceptional under Rule 60(b)(6). The request
for a COA is DENIED.
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“Supreme Court to reconsider two death penalty cases and take up a
redistricting dispute”
Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
June 6, 2016

[Excerpt; References to Moore v. Texas have
been omitted.]
The Supreme Court said Monday it will
reconsider two Texas death penalty cases and
rule on whether evidence of racial bias and
mental impairment calls for removing the
defendants from death row.
Separately, the justices took up a political
redistricting dispute, which asks them to take
a
stronger
stand
against
racial
gerrymandering.
The two death penalty cases will be heard in
the next term beginning in the fall. Neither
asks the high court to strike down the death
penalty, but they have the potential to set
stricter limits on executions and the use of
capital punishment.
In one case, a man convicted of a 1980
shooting during a store robbery in Houston
says he suffers from a mild mental disability.
The justices agreed to hear his claim that
prosecutors and judges in Texas have ignored
earlier rulings that barred executing inmates
with a mental impairment.
The other case involves an African American
defendant who was sentenced to death after
the jury was told he may be especially

dangerous in the future because of his race.
The justices agreed to hear his claim that such
racial bias is cause to set aside his death
sentence.
Last year, liberal Justices Stephen Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said they now believe
the death penalty system is so badly flawed
as to be unconstitutional. There has been no
sign a majority agrees with them.
But if a liberal justice were to join the court
in the next term, there may well be a fivemember majority to enforce tighter limits on
the use of capital punishment.
The February death of Justice Antonin Scalia
has left the court with a vacancy, and the
GOP-controlled Senate is refusing to
consider President Obama’s nomination of
Judge Merrick Garland, saying the decision
should be left to the next president.
Since Scalia’s death, the eight justices have
steered clear of taking new cases that could
provoke an ideological divide or a 4-4
deadlock. But the Texas cases may be the
exception and lead to rulings that sharply
split the court.
[…]

121

In the second case, lawyers for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund urged the justices to set
aside the death sentence for Duane Buck
because of trial testimony suggesting that
black people are more dangerous.
“Trial counsel's knowing reliance on false,
inflammatory and deeply prejudicial
evidence explicitly linking Mr. Buck's race to
his likelihood of future dangerousness is
plainly extraordinary,” they said in the case
of Buck vs. Stephens. “We are hopeful that
the Supreme Court will correct this egregious
error, and that Texas will acknowledge Mr.
Buck's right to a new sentencing hearing free
of racial bias.”
[…]
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“U.S. top court to hear appeals by two black Texas death row inmates”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
June 6, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to take up two death penalty appeals brought
by black Texas inmates, one citing racially
tinged trial testimony and the other
challenging how the state gauges intellectual
disabilities that could preclude execution.
The cases involve convicted murderers
Duane Buck and Bobby Moore, who are
challenging their sentences in a state that
executes more death row inmates than any
other. Both crimes occurred in Houston.
They are the only death penalty cases the
court has taken up so far for its next term,
which starts in October and ends in June
2017.
Buck, 52, was convicted in 1995 of fatally
shooting his former girlfriend while her
young children watched, as well as another
man. He is seeking a new sentencing hearing,
claiming his trial lawyer was ineffective and
that the proceedings were tainted by racial
discrimination.
His current lawyers said in court papers the
lawyer who represented Buck at his trial
called a clinical psychologist as a defense
witness to testify on the likelihood of Buck
committing future offenses. The expert
testified that Buck was more likely to be
dangerous because he is black. Buck's current
lawyers said in court papers that "the alleged

link between race and future dangerousness
has been proven false."
"We are hopeful that the Supreme Court will
correct this egregious error, and that Texas
will acknowledge Mr. Buck's right to a new
sentencing hearing free of racial bias. Justice
can only be served in this extraordinary case
of racial bias by a new sentencing hearing
free
of
inflammatory,
inaccurate
stereotypes," Buck's lawyers said in a
statement.
Intellectual Disability Evidence
Moore, 56, was convicted at age 20 of fatally
shooting a 70-year-old grocery clerk during a
1980 robbery.
His appeal seeking to overturn his death
sentence focuses on how judges should
weigh medical evidence of intellectual
disability. Under Supreme Court precedent,
people who are intellectually disabled cannot
be sentenced to death. His lawyers said that a
lower court found that Moore's IQ of 70 was
"within the range of mild mental retardation."
The standard for assessing intellectual
disability is crucial because the Supreme
Court in 2002 ruled that the execution of
intellectually disabled, or mentally retarded,
defendants violates the U.S. Constitution's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
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Moore's lawyers argued that the lower court
wrongly used an "outdated" 23-year-old
definition used in Texas of intellectual
disability when it determined that Moore was
not intellectually disabled.
Moore's lawyers also had asked the Supreme
Court to consider the question of whether the
amount of time he has spent on death row
awaiting execution since his 1980 conviction
violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. The justices declined to
decide that issue, although the court on
Monday initially announced in error that they
would.
Moore has been held for 15 years in solitary
confinement, his lawyers said.

The Supreme Court's justices have sharply
disagreed among themselves over capital
punishment. Last year, they upheld
Oklahoma's lethal injection process in a 5-4
ruling. Two of the court's liberals who
dissented in that ruling, Stephen Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, raised concerns that
the death penalty amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment.
But the court has shown no signs it will take
up the broader question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty.
Last week, it rejected a black Louisiana death
row inmate's appeal making that claim, with
Breyer again expressing his view that the
death penalty may be unconstitutional in part
because of geographical disparities in the
way it is implemented.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up 2 Texas Death Penalty Appeals”
Law360
Jess Davis
June 6, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to review two Texas death penalty cases that
question the constitutionality of such
sentences for individuals with intellectual
disabilities and question when expert
witnesses testify about a defendant’s
proclivity for future violence based on race.
Although the court initially indicated that it
would also consider the question of whether
execution of a condemned individual more
than 35 years after he was placed on death
row constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, a corrected orders list released
later on Monday morning narrowed the focus
of that appeal — Bobby Moore v. Texas —
to intellectual disability only.
The Moore case will now be considered only
on the question of whether current medical
standards on intellectual disability should
displace outdated precedent. Moore, who was
found to have an IQ of 70, was sentenced to
death after a robbery attempt in which he was
found to have shot and killed a store
employee.
The second case is Duane Buck v. William
Stephens, director of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, in which Buck claims ineffective

assistance of counsel. During his trial, Buck’s
defense lawyer presented an expert witness
who testified that Buck was more likely to be
dangerous in the future because he is black,
in a case in which future dangerousness was
both a prerequisite for a death sentence and
the central issue at sentencing, according to
his petition for certiorari.
Buck’s defense lawyers say that his case is an
“extraordinary instance of racial bias” that
interfered with his right to fair sentencing,
and said in a statement on Monday that the
court’s decision to hear his appeal is “an
important step toward restoring public
confidence in the integrity of the courts.”
“At this point in time, our national
conversation about race makes this case all
the more important,” Buck attorney Kate
Black of the Texas Defender Service told
Law360 on Monday. “Duane Buck’s case
and the way it’s been treated is widely out of
step with other circuits.”
Counsel for the state and for Moore did not
immediately respond to requests for
comment on Monday.
Texas opposed the petitions for certiorari in
both cases.
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In Moore’s case, the state argued that
individual states are responsible for
developing appropriate ways to enforce a
constitutional restriction against executing
intellectually disabled offenders, and said
that no previous Supreme Court precedent
requires it to employ a given clinical
definition of intellectual disability. Texas
argued that the standard used to evaluate
Moore is “remarkably similar” to the current
definition espoused by the medical
community, making distinction unnecessary,
and said that the legal decision of whether a
defendant is intellectually disabled belongs in
the hands of the judicial system, not medical
professionals.
Buck was found guilty for the shooting
deaths of his ex-girlfriend and another man.
In his case, Texas argued that the defense
expert testified only that minorities,
Hispanics and blacks were overrepresented in
the criminal justice system and said that the
expert witness did not tie Buck’s race to his
future dangerousness. Texas told the
Supreme Court that the jury heard evidence
of Buck’s past criminal record and testimony
from another ex-girlfriend about his future
propensity to violence that supported its
finding.

oore is represented by Cliff Sloan, Donald
Salzman, Lauryn Fraas, Michael McIntosh,
Brendan Gants, Luke Varley, Alex Blaszczuk
and Peter Horn of Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher & Flom LLP.
Buck is represented by Sherrilyn Ifill, Janai
Nelson, Christina Swarns, Jin Hee Lee,
Natasha Korgaonkar and Natasha Merle of
the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund Inc., Kathryn Kase and Kate Black of
the Texas Defender Service, and Samuel
Spital of Holland & Knight LLP.
Texas is represented by Ken Paxton, Jeff
Mateer, Adrienne McFarland, Edward L.
Marshall and Fredericka Sargent of the Texas
Attorney General’s office. Stephens is also
represented by Jeremy Greenwell of the
Attorney General’s office
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“Man Sentenced To Die After ‘Expert’ Testified That Black People Are
Dangerous”
Think Progress
Ian Millhiser
April 25, 2016

Duane Edward Buck’s lawyers were a
disaster.
After Buck was convicted of murder, his own
attorneys retained a now-discredited
psychologist who testified that Mr. Buck is
more likely to be a danger to society in the
future because he is black. This testimony
then went unchallenged at a later, crucial
state court proceeding even though Buck was
then represented by a new lawyer. The only
new claim that lawyer raised at this
proceeding was “based on a non-existent
provision of the penal code.”
Now, nearly two decades after his conviction,
no court has considered whether the racist
testimony elicited at Buck’s trial caused him
to be sentenced to death. Moreover, thanks to
errors committed by his previous lawyers and
an array of laws and legal doctrines that often
elevate the finality of convictions ahead of
the need to ensure that innocents are not
punished and that the death penalty is not
doled out unnecessarily, it is far from clear
that any court will examine the impact of this
racist testimony before Mr. Buck is put to
death.

The specific legal issue in Buck v. Stephens
is complex enough to make a lawyer’s brain
bleed. Specifically, Mr. Buck is seeking
permission to seek a determination of
whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist
that would permit a lower court to determine
whether the racist testimony elicited by his
own counsel prejudiced the outcome of his
sentencing proceeding. If he somehow
succeeds in navigating this maze, he wins a
new sentencing hearing — which could very
well determine that he should be re-sentenced
to death.
It’s a giant procedural mess. And it’s a mess
that Texas, at one point, appeared willing to
set aside. In 2000, then-Texas Attorney
General John Cornyn (now a U.S. Senator)
determined that Dr. Walter Quijano, the
psychologist who testified in Buck’s case,
had a record of appearing in capital
sentencing proceedings and offering racist
testimony. In Buck’s case, Quijano testified
that African-Americans and Hispanics are
especially likely to be dangerous as they are
“over represented in the Criminal Justice
System.”
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This is not simply a case of ineffective
assistance of counsel, this is a case of
ineffective assistance of counsel aggravated
by even more ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Cornyn’s office found six additional cases
where Dr. Quijano offered similar testimony,
and it announced that it “will not object” if
the inmates sentenced to die in these cases
“seek to overturn the death sentences based
on Mr. Quijano’s testimony.” As Cornyn’s
office admitted in a brief filed in one of these
cases “infusion of race as a factor for the jury
to weigh in making its determination violated
[a defendant’s] constitutional right to be
sentenced without regard to the color of his
skin.”
Nevertheless, when Buck sought relief from
his death sentence four years later in federal
court, the state did not keep its promise.
Texas now claims that Buck’s case differs
from the other six cases specifically because
Dr. Quijano’s racist conclusions were placed
before the jury by Buck’s own counsel. As
Justice Samuel Alito argued in a 2011
opinion explaining why he did not believe
that the Supreme Court should have heard a
previous iteration of Buck’s case, “only in
Buck’s case did defense counsel elicit the
race-related testimony on direct examination.
Thus, this is the only case in which it can be
said that the responsibility for eliciting the
offensive testimony lay squarely with the
defense.”
That may very well be true, but it is an odd
conclusion for a judge charged with
interpreting a Constitution that not only
forbids race discrimination in sentencing, but
that also forbids sentencing someone to die

without adequate assistance of counsel. Buck
argues that he is the victim to two
overlapping constitutional violations — he
did not receive adequate assistance of
counsel and, for that very reason, his own
lawyer introduced unconstitutional evidence
against him. Justice Alito, by contrast,
appears to claim that the first of these two
constitutional violations excuses the second.
In fairness, the real reason why Buck has
previously been unable to assert his claim
that he received ineffective legal assistance is
a bit more complicated. For this is not simply
a case of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this is a case of ineffective assistance of
counsel aggravated by even more ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In 1999, sometime after Buck received a
death sentence, a new lawyer was appointed
to represent the inmate in state habeas
proceedings — a round of proceedings Texas
state law permits for individuals seeking to
challenge a death sentence. That lawyer,
according to the petition now pending before
the Supreme Court, “had a history of
deficient representation of death-sentenced
prisoners,” including one case where he
“threw his client ‘under the bus’ by filing an
initial state habeas application that was ‘only
four pages long and merely state[d] factual
and legal conclusions.’”
While Buck’s original lawyers’ sin was a sin
of commission — that is, they were the ones
who introduced Dr. Quijano’s racist
testimony — the new lawyer’s sin was a sin
of omission. The new lawyer did not
challenge the original legal team’s decision
to present Quijano’s testimony to the jury.
That failure to assert what may be Buck’s
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strongest legal claim at a relatively early
stage in this litigation had devastating
consequences once Buck’s case reached
federal court. As a federal district judge
explained, Buck’s claim that his original
lawyers screwed up was “procedurally
defaulted” because his new lawyer failed to
raise this claim soon enough. Thus Buck risks
losing the ability to assert this claim forever.
Then, in 2013, Buck finally got a piece of
good news. In a pair of cases, Martinez v.
Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme
Court held that there should be a “narrow
exception” to the previously existing rule that
“an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a
postconviction proceeding does not qualify
as cause to excuse a procedural default.”
Thanks to these decisions, Buck now has a
shot at overcoming the two rounds of
ineffective legal representation he received
over a decade ago.
To be sure, the path ahead for him will not be
easy. Buck still must navigate a maze of
procedural obstacles, and his only chances of
finding the end of this maze depends on legal
doctrines that use phrases like “narrow
exception”
and
“extraordinary
circumstances.” Buck’s path to relief from
his death sentence is riddled with obstacles
that very few litigants manage to surmount.
Which brings us to the final irony in Mr.
Buck’s case. At the earliest stages of the
many rounds of litigation concerning his
sentence, Buck faced none of these nearly
insurmountable procedural obstacles. And
yet he appears to have received two rounds of
unconstitutionally
ineffective
legal
assistance.

Now, however, when Buck is hemmed in by
almost immovable legal barriers, he is backed
by a simply staggering array of legal talent.
The team of attorneys representing Buck in
the Supreme Court includes six lawyers from
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the historic
civil rights organization founded by future
Justice Thurgood Marshall. It also includes a
partner in a large law firm who previously
clerked for a Supreme Court justice. That’s
enough legal firepower to level a mountain.
This is not an uncommon practice in capital
cases, where high-octane lawyers frequently
take over cases that present issues worthy of
Supreme Court review years after a death row
inmate
received
far-from-outstanding
representation.
Excellent attorneys — and certainly, the kind
of extraordinary attorneys who now represent
Mr. Buck — are a sparse resource. It’s not
realistic to expect lawyers of the caliber of his
current legal team to represent every criminal
defendant who faces a death sentence.
Nevertheless, there is something profoundly
misguided about a system that assigns such
defendants’ lawyers who aren’t even
minimally adequate when those defendants
need good lawyers the most.
Mr. Buck’s case, in other words, is a tale of
racism compounded by double standards,
poor legal representation, and a system that
often says that it is more important to have
certainty in death sentencing than it is for
courts to reach the proper result. And now
that he finally has more-than-adequate
representation, Buck could very well learn
that the cavalry arrived too late.
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Moore v. Texas
15-797
Ruling Below: Ex Parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Moore filed for a relief from
judgment on the grounds that Moore possessed an intellectual disability that would preclude a
death sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Moore
next sought federal habeas relief. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted
relief, and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed as modified and remanded.
The 185th Judicial District Court, Harris County, once again sentenced the defendant to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on appeal. Moore sought a writ of habeas corpus, and a
habeas judge granted relief in part and denied relief in part. The Court of Criminal Appeals then
denied relief in all parts.
Question Presented: Whether prohibiting the use of modern medical standards in the evaluation
of mental disability for the purpose of determining whether an individual may be executed
violates the Eighth Amendment and the decisions in Hall v. Florida and Atkins v. Virginia.

Ex Parte Bobby James Moore, Applicant.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Decided on September 16, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations, footnotes, and elements not subject to certiorari grant are omitted]

In 1980, appellant was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death for fatally
shooting a seventy-year-old grocery clerk,
James McCarble, in Houston, Texas, while
committing or attempting to commit robbery.
We affirmed the 1980 conviction and
sentence. Following a grant of federal habeas
corpus relief, the trial court held a new
punishment hearing in February 2001.
Appellant again received a death sentence.
We affirmed the trial court’s judgment on
direct appeal.

In this initial writ application challenging his
2001 punishment retrial and death sentence,
applicant raises forty-eight claims for relief.
In January 2014, the habeas judge held a twoday evidentiary hearing on applicant’s first
claim for relief—the allegation that he is
intellectually disabled and therefore exempt
from execution under the Supreme Court’s
holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002).
Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties
filed proposed findings of fact and
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conclusions of law. Applicant’s proposed
findings and conclusions were contained in a
document entitled, “Addendum Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Claims 1–3”
(Addendum
Findings).
Despite
the
document’s caption, applicant’s proposed
findings and conclusions addressed only his
Atkins claim (i.e., his first claim for relief).
The State’s proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law addressed all of
applicant’s alleged grounds for relief.
The habeas court signed applicant’s proposed
Addendum Findings. The Addendum
Findings applied the definition of intellectual
disability presently used by the American
Association
on
Intellectual
and
Developmental
Disabilities
(AAIDD),
concluded that applicant is intellectually
disabled under that definition, and
recommended that we grant relief on his
Atkins claim. The Addendum Findings also
concluded that applicant had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is
intellectually disabled under the diagnostic
criteria stated in the fourth and fifth editions
of the American Psychiatric Association’s
(APA’s) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM), i.e., the DSM-IV
and DSM-V.
The habeas court also signed the State’s
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law after making certain handwritten
alterations to the final page. Through its
alterations, the habeas court: (1) indicated
that applicant’s grounds for relief should be
granted in part and denied in part; and (2)
adopted the State’s proposed findings and
conclusions concerning claims four through
forty-eight, as well as its recommendation
that we deny relief concerning those claims.
The habeas court made no findings or
conclusions regarding applicant’s claims two
and three.

We filed and set the case to address
applicant’s Atkins allegation. We now deny
relief on all of applicant’s claims.
In Atkins, the Supreme Court determined that
the execution of intellectually disabled
individuals violates the Eighth Amendment,
but left it to the States to develop appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320. In Ex parte
Briseno, citing the absence of legislation to
implement Atkins’s mandate, we adopted the
definition of intellectual disability stated in
the ninth edition of the AAMR manual,
published in 1992, and the similar definition
of intellectual disability contained in section
591.003(13) of the Texas Health and Safety
Code.
Because our Legislature has not enacted
legislation to implement Atkins’s mandate,
we continue to follow the AAMR’s 1992
definition of intellectual disability that we
adopted in Briseno for Atkins claims
presented in Texas death-penalty cases. Thus,
to demonstrate that he is intellectually
disabled for Eighth Amendment purposes
and therefore exempt from execution, an
applicant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that: (1) he suffers from
significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, generally shown by an
intelligence quotient (IQ) of 70 or less; (2) his
significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning is accompanied by related and
significant
limitations
in
adaptive
functioning; and (3) the onset of the above
two characteristics occurred before the age of
eighteen.
The habeas judge therefore erred by
disregarding our case law and employing the
definition of intellectual disability presently
used by the AAIDD, a definition which
notably omits the requirement that an
individual’s adaptive behavior deficits, if
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any, must be “related to” significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. The
habeas court reasoned that, in Briseno, we
derived our legal test for intellectual
disability in capital cases from the AAMR’s
1992 definition of intellectual disability.
Because the AAMR’s and APA’s
conceptions of intellectual disability and its
diagnosis have changed since Atkins and
Briseno were decided, the habeas court
concluded that it should use the most current
position, as espoused byAAIDD, regarding
the diagnosis of intellectual disability rather
than the test that we established in Briseno.
It may be true that the AAIDD’s and APA’s
positions regarding the diagnosis of
intellectual disability have changed since
Atkins and Briseno were decided. Indeed, we
have recently discussed the subjectivity
surrounding the medical diagnosis of
intellectual disability and some of the causes
for that subjectivity. But although the mentalhealth fields and opinions of mental-health
experts inform the factual decision, they do
not determine whether an individual is
exempt from execution under Atkins. The
decision to modify the legal standard for
intellectual disability in the capitalsentencing context rests with this Court
unless and until the Legislature acts, which
we have repeatedly asked it to do. We
conclude that, at this juncture, the legal test
we established in Briseno remains adequately
“informed by the medical community’s
diagnostic framework.”
Regarding Briseno’s first prong, “general
intellectual functioning” is “defined by the
[IQ]” and “obtained by assessment with a
standardized, individually administered
intelligence test.” There is a measurement
error of approximately five points in
assessing IQ, which may vary from
instrument to instrument. Therefore, when
determining whether an applicant has met
Briseno’s first prong, we consider the fact

that any IQ score could actually represent a
score that is five points higher or five points
lower than the score that he actually obtained.
In Cathey, we examined whether mentalhealth experts or factfinders should adjust
IQ scores for the “Flynn Effect” in making a
determination of intellectual disability under
Atkins. We concluded that, although
factfinders may consider the concept of the
Flynn Effect in assessing the validity of a
score obtained on a now “outmoded” or
“outdated” version of an IQ test, they may
consider that effect only in the way that they
consider an IQ examiner’s assessment of
malingering,
depression,
lack
of
concentration, etc. We stated that the IQ test
score itself may not be changed. In analyzing
whether applicant’s general intellectual
functioning is significantly sub-average, the
habeas court therefore erred by subtracting
points from applicant’s IQ scores for the
Flynn Effect and considering both applicant’s
unadjusted and Flynn-Effect-adjusted IQ
scores.
For purposes of the Eighth Amendment,
“adaptive behavior” refers to the ordinary
skills that are required for people to function
in their everyday lives. We have cited with
approval the AAIDD’s grouping of adaptive
behavior into three areas (conceptual skills,
social skills, and practical skills) for purposes
of making a clinical diagnosis of intellectual
disability. Limitations in adaptive behavior
can be determined by using standardized
tests. We have also recognized the APA’s
position, expressed in the DSM-IV, that for
purposes of clinical diagnosis, a “significant
limitation” is defined by a score of at least
two standard deviations below either (1) the
mean in one of the three adaptive behavior
skills areas or (2) the overall score on a
standardized measure of conceptual, social,
and practical skills. Although standardized
tests are not the sole measure of adaptive
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functioning, they may be helpful to the
factfinder,
who
has
the
ultimate
responsibility for determining intellectual
disability in the Atkins context.
In the Eighth Amendment context, it is not
sufficient for an applicant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has
significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning and significant limitations in
adaptive functioning. An applicant must also
demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that his adaptive behavior deficits
are related to significantly sub-average
general intellectual functioning rather than
some other cause. The habeas court in this
case failed to make the relatedness inquiry.
In making the relatedness determination, the
factfinder may consider the seven evidentiary
factors that we developed in Briseno:
• Did those who knew the person best
during the developmental stage—his
family, friends, teachers, employers,
authorities—think
he
was
[intellectually disabled] at that time,
and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and
carried them through or is his conduct
impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or
does it show that he is led around by
others?
• Is his conduct in response to external
stimuli rational and appropriate,
regardless of whether it is socially
acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently,
rationally, and on point to oral or

written questions or do his responses
wander from subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie
effectively in his own or others’
interests?
• Putting aside any heinousness or
gruesomeness surrounding the capital
offense, did the commission of that
offense
require
forethought,
planning, and complex execution of
purpose?
We look to the entirety of the record before
us in an Atkins inquiry. In addition, we
“consider all of the person’s functional
abilities,” including “those that show strength
as well as those that show weakness.” The
habeas court therefore additionally erred to
the extent that it found that applicant’s prison
records were “not appropriate tools by which
to exclude intellectual disability in capital
murder cases” and considered only
weaknesses in applicant’s functional
abilities.
In failing to make the relatedness inquiry, the
habeas judge’s factual findings and legal
conclusions left the second prong of the
Briseno test unresolved. In addition, our
independent review of the record reveals that
it does not support the habeas judge’s
findings
or
conclusions
concerning
applicant’s Atkins claim. In short, the habeas
judge appears to have either not considered,
or unreasonably disregarded, a vast array of
evidence in this lengthy record that cannot
rationally be squared with a finding of
intellectual-disability. For these reasons, we
do not adopt the habeas court’s findings and
conclusions regarding applicant’s Atkins
claim, but instead assume our role as the
ultimate factfinder in this case.
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We hold that applicant has not established by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is
intellectually disabled under Atkins and
Briseno. Accordingly, applicant is not
exempt from the death penalty, and we deny
him relief on his first ground.

agreed that Koonce would enter the courtesy
booth and take the money that was inside.
Applicant would carry the shotgun and
position himself at the courtesy booth so that
he could guard the booth and watch the
store’s front entrance. Pradia would carry the
pistol and empty the checkout registers.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
The lengthy factual and procedural history of
applicant’s case is relevant to our
adjudication of his Atkins claim and provides
context for the testimony elicited by the
parties at his 2014 evidentiary hearing.
A. Applicant’s 1980 Capital Murder Trial
The evidence at applicant’s 1980 trial
showed that, on April 25, 1980, Anthony
Pradia and Willie Albert “Ricky” Koonce
visited applicant at Betty Nolan’s house, 10
where applicant lived when he was not
staying with his girlfriend, Shirley Carmen.
Pradia testified that he, Koonce, and
applicant each needed money for car
payments. While the three men were playing
dice, Koonce suggested that they commit a
robbery, and Pradia and applicant agreed.
Applicant provided the weapons for the
robbery, specifically, a shotgun and a .32
caliber pistol. Applicant and Pradia hid the
weapons in the trunk of Koonce’s car. The
three men then drove around various areas of
Houston in Koonce’s car, looking for a place
in which to commit the robbery.
After taking turns casing the Birdsall Super
Market, the three men settled on it as the
place in which they would commit the
robbery and negotiated how they would
divide the proceeds. Because they were using
his car, Koonce wanted a larger share of the
proceeds. After some argument, Pradia and
applicant agreed that they would each pay
Koonce $200 from their shares. The men then
discussed their roles in the robbery. They

The three men then entered the store. Pradia
entered first, with the pistol in his pants.
Koonce entered next. Applicant entered last.
The shotgun he was carrying was obscured
by two plastic bags. Applicant and Pradia
wore wigs. Applicant also wore sunglasses.
Applicant and Koonce approached the
courtesy booth, which was staffed by store
employees McCarble and Edna Scott.
Koonce entered the booth, told McCarble and
Scott that they were being robbed, and
demanded money. Applicant, who by this
time had removed the plastic bags from the
shotgun, pointed the weapon at McCarble
and Scott through the booth’s window. When
Scott screamed that the store was being
robbed, applicant pointed the shotgun at
McCarble, looked down the barrel, and shot
him in the head. McCarble died instantly.
Applicant, Pradia, and Koonce ran from the
store and got back into Koonce’s car, where
applicant stated that he had shot the man in
the booth. The men 12 fled the scene. Koonce
drove back to Nolan’s house to drop
applicant off and to allow Pradia to retrieve
his car. The men then split up. Applicant
spent the night of the offense at Nolan’s
house.
Witnesses provided a license-plate number
and descriptions of the getaway vehicle and
perpetrators, which quickly led Houston
Police Department (HPD) homicide
detectives to arrest Koonce. While searching
Koonce’s vehicle, officers discovered
Pradia’s wallet and identification, which
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Pradia had inadvertently left behind.
Following Koonce’s arrest, Pradia turned
himself in. Based on information in Koonce’s
and Pradia’s statements, detectives obtained
a warrant for applicant’s arrest. During a
consensual search of Nolan’s house,
investigators found a shotgun hidden
between the mattress and box springs of
applicant’s bed.

At the suppression hearing, applicant denied
giving or signing the statement. He asserted
that one or more of the interrogating officers
had beaten him when he refused to cooperate.
Although he acknowledged that his signature
was on the statement, applicant argued that
his interrogators must have traced it from a
blank piece of paper that he signed after being
told that he would be released if he did so.

Applicant, who left Houston on the day after
Koonce gave his statement, remained at
large. HPD detectives were unable to
ascertain applicant’s whereabouts until May
2, 1980, when they received a tip that he
could be found at his grandmother’s
residence in Louisiana. On May 5, 1980, ten
days after the offense, Louisiana authorities
arrested applicant at his grandmother’s house
pursuant to a fugitive warrant. Incident to the
arrest, Louisiana officers discovered a small
suitcase containing a pistol and $612 in cash.
Applicant, who previously had a full head of
hair, had shaved his hair down to the scalp.

When he later testified in front of the jury,
applicant again denied giving or signing the
statement. Applicant testified that he was
“quite sure” that someone who had been to
prison before (as he had) would know better
than to sign a confession. Applicant also
denied any involvement in the offense,
asserting that he was in Louisiana when the
robbery and McCarble’s death occurred.
Applicant’s eldest sister, Clara Jean Baker,
also testified for the defense and corroborated
applicant’s alibi.

HPD detectives traveled to Louisiana, took
applicant into custody, and returned him to
Houston. In Houston, applicant gave a
written statement in which he admitted to
participating in the robbery and to killing
McCarble, although he asserted that
McCarble’s death was accidental. According
to applicant, during the screaming and 13
panic that ensued after Scott cried out, he
“suddenly fell backwards and the butt of the
gun hit [his] arm and the gun went off.”
Applicant claimed that he later learned that
the man in the booth had been shot. Applicant
“[swore that he] was not trying to kill the old
man and the whole thing was a[n] accident.”
Applicant testified twice at his trial, first at a
hearing on his motion to suppress his
statement and later during the defense’s guiltinnocence
case-in-chief.
The
State
crossexamined applicant on both occasions.

With the third perpetrator’s identity at issue,
the State presented rebuttal evidence that
applicant had committed robberies at two
other grocery stores just days before
McCarble’s murder. The earlier robberies
occurred in a similar manner to the robbery
in which McCarble died, with applicant
wielding a shotgun and guarding the stores’
courtesy booths while accomplices took
money.
The jury found applicant guilty of capital
murder. At the punishment phase, pursuant to
applicant’s stipulation, the State introduced
his penitentiary packet. The penitentiary
packet showed that applicant had four 1977
felony convictions (three for burglary of a
habitation with the intent to commit theft and
one for aggravated robbery) for offenses he
committed in December 1976 and January
1977. Before accepting the stipulation, the
trial court questioned applicant directly to
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determine whether his stipulation was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Applicant’s trial counsel did not call any
witnesses or present any evidence at the
punishment phase. Based on the jury’s
answers to the special issues, the trial court
sentenced applicant to death.
B. Applicant’s Initial Direct Appeal
The trial court appointed Richard Bonner,
one of applicant’s trial counsel, to represent
applicant on direct appeal. After receiving
multiple extensions of time, Bonner filed an
appellate brief for applicant in July 1983.
Between October 1980 and July 1983, the
trial court and this Court received numerous
pro se motions and pleadings from applicant.
The documents concerned applicant’s desire
to participate in his appeal; need for access to
the record; growing displeasure with
Bonner’s appellate representation; and
dissatisfaction with the trial court’s failure to
appoint another attorney or to allow applicant
to represent himself on appeal pursuant to
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In
October 1983, applicant’s dissatisfaction
culminated with his filing of a pro se petition
for a writ of mandamus, in which he asked us
to require the trial court to dismiss Bonner
and to allow applicant to represent himself on
appeal.
We remanded the case to the trial court for a
Faretta hearing, which the trial court held on
November 2, 1983. George L. Walker, the
1980 trial judge, presided. Applicant
advocated on his own behalf and presented
five exhibits in support of his request to
proceed pro se. Applicant’s exhibits, which
were admitted into evidence, included letters
that he had written to Bonner regarding the
appeal. At the hearing, applicant read several
of those letters aloud without any apparent

difficulty. When it became evident that
applicant was unaware that Bonner had filed
a brief, the trial court recessed the hearing for
an hour to allow applicant to review the
pleading. When the hearing resumed, the trial
court questioned applicant to ascertain
whether he understood and was satisfied with
the legal issues that Bonner had raised.
Applicant
responded
rationally
and
coherently, although he struggled somewhat
to explain Bonner’s legal arguments to the
trial court. At the hearing’s conclusion, after
applicant reaffirmed that he was willing to
accept new appellate counsel, the trial court
allowed Bonner to withdraw and appointed
John H. Ward. After considering the claims
raised by Bonner and Ward, as well as claims
raised by applicant in a “Supplemental ProSe Brief for the Appellant,” filed-stamped
February 26, 1985, we affirmed the
conviction and sentence. The trial court set
applicant’s execution for February 26, 1986.
C. Applicant’s Previous State and Federal
Habeas Proceedings
In February 1986, the Supreme Court denied
applicant’s out-of-time petition for a writ of
certiorari and application for a stay of
execution filed through new appellate
counsel, Carolyn Garcia. We subsequently
denied applicant leave to file an application
for an original writ of habeas corpus, denied
his first application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, and
denied his accompanying motion for a stay of
execution.
After we denied the motion for stay of
execution, applicant’s counsel filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and motion for a
stay of execution in federal district court. The
federal district court granted a stay. In June
1987, after determining that applicant’s
petition contained an unexhausted claim, the
federal district court dismissed applicant’s
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petition without prejudice to refiling upon
exhaustion of the claim in state court.
On April 6, 1992, now represented by
attorneys Rick G. Strange, Richard R.
Fletcher, and Kristi Franklin Hyatt, applicant
filed his second Article 11.07 application. In
relevant part, applicant alleged that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
pursuing an alibi defense and, in furtherance
of that defense, persuading applicant and his
sister, Clara Jean Baker, to perjure
themselves at the 1980 trial. Applicant
further alleged that trial counsel were
ineffective for failing to investigate, discover,
and present mitigating evidence at the
punishment phase. Relying in part on Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which the
Supreme Court decided after his federal
habeas petition’s dismissal, applicant for the
first time alleged that trial counsel should
have discovered and presented evidence that
he experienced a troubled childhood, as well
as evidence that his intellectual functioning
fell in the intellectually disabled or borderline
range. To support the allegations, habeas
counsel attached some of applicant’s school
and prison records, as well as affidavits
executed in 1992 by three of applicant’s
siblings (Clara Jean Baker, Colleen
McNeese, and Ronnie Moore) and
applicant’s brother-in-law, Larry Baker.
The school records attached to applicant’s
1992 writ application included his academic,
attendance, and cumulative health records, as
well as scores that he obtained on the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) given in third
through sixth grades. The records also
included the report of applicant’s 1965 prekindergarten school medical examination.
The examining doctor recommended
psychological testing, commenting, “Child is
very withdrawn—maybe retarded but most
likely emotional problems.”

The school records additionally included two
IQ scores. In 1971, when he was twelve years
old and in fifth grade, applicant obtained an
IQ score of 77 on an Otis Lennon Mental
Abilities Test (OLMAT). When he was
thirteen years old and in sixth grade,
applicant was referred to Marcelle Tucker,
M.Ed., for a psychological evaluation
because he was performing below grade
level, was withdrawn, and took no part in
class unless called upon. In her report, Tucker
stated that, on January 24, 1973, she gave
applicant a Wechsler Intelligence Test for
Children (WISC) and two tests of perceptualmotor coordination, specifically, a Bender
Visual Motor Gestalt (Bender Gestalt) test
and a Goodenough Draw-a- Man test. Tucker
reported that applicant obtained a full scale
IQ score 15 of 78 on the WISC and “mental
age” scores of eight years, eleven months on
the Bender Gestalt and nine years, six months
on the Goodenough.
Tucker noted in her report that applicant was
then attending his third elementary school. In
describing applicant’s appearance and test
behavior, Tucker described him as “nice
looking” and “neatly dressed - very up-tight did not use left hand even to hold paper when
it skidded.” In remarks concerning
applicant’s test results, Tucker again noted
his test behavior: “During testing, [applicant]
was extremely controlled. He made only the
barest minimum of movements. His answers
were given in as few words as possible.”
Tucker continued:
The
disparity
between
[the]
“Information”
(4)
and
“Comprehension” (8) [subtests] on
the WISC indicated that perhaps this
is a child who has not been taught, but
who can learn.
Low scores on the Bender and
Goodenough [tests] seem to be
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negated by the average scores on
“Block Design” (9) and “Object
Assembly” (9) [subtests] on the
WISC.
Tucker recommended that applicant stay in
regular classes, but suggested that the school
modify his program by using certain specific
teaching techniques to strengthen his areas of
academic weakness.
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ) records attached to applicant’s 1992
writ application included a February 28, 1984
report
of
applicant’s
psychological
evaluation by psychologist George Wheat.
Wheat stated that he was conducting the
review at the request of the Psychological
Screening Committee to assist it with
determining applicant’s work-capable status.
Wheat stated that applicant self-reported 16
“fairly regular [past] employment as [a]
construction laborer and clothing sales
clerk.” Wheat also noted that applicant was
neatly dressed and exhibited no hesitancy in
answering questions. He stated that
applicant’s responses “were appropriate to
his 9th grade educational level and indicated
[an estimated full scale] IQ of 71.” Wheat
concluded that applicant was workcapable.
The TDCJ records attached to applicant’s
1992 application also showed that, in January
1989, following an internal quality-assurance
audit, applicant was given a complete WAISR by a TDCJ psychologist. Applicant, who
was thirty years old at the time, obtained a
full scale IQ score that was reported as “not
[falling within the] retarded range.” The
record currently before us shows that
applicant obtained a full scale IQ score of 74
on the 1989 WAIS-R.
The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing
on April 23, 1993, to address applicant’s
ineffective-assistance allegations. Judge Carl

Walker Jr. presided. Dr. Robert J. Borda, a
clinical
neuro-psychologist,
reviewed
applicant’s school and TDCJ records and
testified for applicant. Borda stated that
applicant’s scores on the 1973 WISC and
1989 WAIS-R fell within the borderline
range of intelligence (70–79) but asserted
that applicant’s “mental age” at the time of
the offense was no greater than fourteen
years. Borda further asserted that applicant’s
failure to reach for falling papers during
Tucker’s 1973 WISC testing was unusual and
consistent with behavior sometimes seen in
brain-injured people. However, Borda
acknowledged that the records he reviewed
did not mention a head injury.
Despite his opinions regarding applicant’s
mental age at the time of the offense, Borda
did not purport to diagnose applicant as
intellectually disabled. Borda testified that IQ
tests were developed to measure a person’s
potential to succeed in an academic setting
and acknowledged that someone who
obtained IQ scores in the borderline range of
intelligence might well be capable of
functioning successfully in the everyday
world. On crossexamination, the State asked
Borda whether applicant was capable of
formulating complex arguments concerning
his trial representation. Borda testified that,
based on the documents he had reviewed, he
“[saw] nothing that would indicate that
[applicant] has really severe deficits in
communication skills. I think he’s . . . able to
communicate adequately.”
Applicant’s sisters, Clara Jean Baker and
Colleen McNeese, and his brother-in-law,
Larry Baker, also testified at the 1993
evidentiary hearing. They testified that
applicant’s father, Ernest Moore Jr.
(“Junior”), was a neglectful, physically and
verbally abusive alcoholic who beat his wife,
Marion, and their nine children, and threw
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applicant out of the family home when he was
fourteen years old.
Clara Jean testified that applicant would
watch their parents when they fought, which
was often. Clara Jean asserted that
applicant’s observation made Junior angry
and caused him to beat applicant. Clara Jean
stated that Junior also beat applicant because
applicant tried to protect the other children.
McNeese asserted that, although Junior beat
her and her other brothers, he beat applicant
the most. She testified that Junior threw
applicant out of the house because applicant
could not spell and Junior thought he was
stupid. McNeese stated that, after applicant
was thrown out of the house, she and her
siblings would sneak food to him at night
until Junior discovered what they were doing
and
made
them
stop.
McNeese
acknowledged that Junior also forced her and
her other brothers to leave home.
Larry, who lived next to the Moore family as
a teenager, stated that he had seen Junior
strike applicant, as well as two of applicant’s
brothers. Larry testified that he could
otherwise tell that applicant was suffering
from some sort of physical abuse because
applicant had bruises and appeared hungry,
haggard, and unrested. Larry said that
applicant was generally secretive about the
abuse and reluctant to discuss his family
situation, but he did talk to Larry about it a
couple of times.
Concerning the allegation that Bonner was
ineffective as trial counsel by suborning
perjury, Clara Jean testified that her family
retained Bonner after learning his name from
a young woman whom applicant was dating
at the time. Clara Jean admitted that she lied
at the 1980 trial when she testified that
applicant was with her in Louisiana at the
time of the offense. Clara Jean asserted that
she lied because Bonner convinced her it was

necessary for applicant to avoid the death
penalty and because she wanted to help
applicant.
Applicant also testified at the 1993
evidentiary hearing and was cross-examined.
Regarding the allegation that trial counsel
suborned perjury, applicant admitted that he
signed the written statement offered against
him at the 1980 trial and asserted that the
statement recounted the offense exactly as it
happened. Applicant stated that, although he
also told trial counsel the truth about the
offense, they advised him to testify at trial
and deny giving the confession, which he did.
Applicant also testified that, after his arrest,
he falsely told another inmate that he had a
cache of jewelry. Applicant surmised that
trial counsel heard the story because they
spontaneously asked him if the story were
true and wanted to know the jewelry’s
location and worth. Applicant stated that trial
counsel implied that giving them the jewelry
could increase his chances of a life sentence.
To secure a good effort from trial counsel,
applicant maintained the lie, telling counsel
that the hidden jewelry was worth close to $1
million.
Applicant
initially
avoided
specifying a location for the jewelry by
telling counsel that he did not think it would
be a good idea to disclose it to them.
Eventually, applicant told counsel that the
jewelry was at his grandmother’s house in
Louisiana.
Regarding his background, applicant testified
that his father, Junior, was an alcoholic who
physically abused him as a child and threw
him out of the house permanently at age
fourteen. Applicant stated that he was beaten
and ejected from the family home because he
tried to prevent Junior from beating Marion.
Applicant stated that he needed to find a way
to survive after Junior permanently threw
him out of the house. Because it was difficult
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to simultaneously care for himself and attend
school, he dropped out and became part of
“street life.” Applicant testified that he
frequented pool halls and similar
establishments; slept in the restroom or back
of the pool hall; did not immediately try to
live with anyone else because his siblings
were helping him without their father’s
knowledge; obtained food by stealing it from
stores; and later moved in with a friend.
Applicant testified that school had been
difficult for him. As a student, he “really
couldn’t comprehend words as most kids
would” and “it was difficult for [him] to read
and write.” Applicant asserted that he still
had problems with reading and writing, but
since being imprisoned, he had spent a lot of
time studying and trying to develop himself.
As a result, his skills had improved. When
shown State’s Exhibit 1, a typewritten pro se
pleading titled, “Supplemental Pro-Se Brief
For The Appellant,” which was filedstamped February 26, 1985, and a
handwritten cover letter addressed from
applicant to the Harris County Clerk,
applicant testified that the brief looked
familiar to him as a document that someone
had helped him prepare. He stated that he
knew the contents and purpose of the
document and that he had a part in
researching it.
Bonner testified at the hearing and denied the
allegations made against him. Bonner stated
that applicant insisted before and throughout
trial that he had an alibi and that counsel
pursue such a defense. Bonner said that he
spent a great deal of time talking with
applicant during the course of his trial
representation and that their conversations
included discussions of trial strategy. Bonner
never received the impression that applicant
failed to understand the gravity of his
situation or was unable to assist in his own

defense; Bonner opined that applicant had
assisted counsel very well.
On August 31, 1993, the habeas court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law and
recommended that we deny relief on
applicant’s allegations. We determined that
the record supported the habeas court’s
findings and conclusions and denied relief.
Meanwhile, the trial court set applicant’s
execution date for October 26, 1993.
On October 12, 1993, applicant filed his
second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court, raising the same claims that he
advanced in his second Article 11.07 writ
application. He additionally filed a motion
for stay of execution, which the federal
district court granted. In 1995, the federal
district court found that trial counsel
performed deficiently at both phases of trial,
but that applicant suffered prejudice only as
to punishment. In 1999, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district
court’s determination that applicant was
entitled to punishment relief.
D. 2001 Punishment Retrial
In February 2001, the trial court held a new
punishment trial. The current habeas judge,
Susan Baetz Brown, heard certain pretrial
matters, but Judge Larry Fuller presided over
jury selection and the evidentiary portion of
the punishment retrial.
At trial, the State reintroduced the evidence
that it had presented at the guilt-innocence
and punishment phases of applicant’s 1980
trial. It also introduced applicant’s
disciplinary reports for the period he was
confined on death row before his original
death sentence was vacated.
Those reports showed that, on June 24, 1983,
after showering, applicant stopped at a cell to
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talk to another inmate and ignored three
orders to return to his own cell. After refusing
the third order, applicant told the reporting
officer, “[Y]ou can’t tell me what to do, come
on out from behind those bars and make me
get in my cell. You aren’t man enough to put
me down.” During a later security check at
applicant’s cell, applicant told the officer,
“[Y]ou get out from in front of my cell, you
motherfucker, I wish these bars weren’t
here.” On September 23, 1983, while being
let out for recreation, applicant stopped at
four different cells to talk to other inmates
and ignored eleven orders by the escorting
guard to proceed.
On January 23, 1984, applicant ignored
orders to stop talking to another inmate and
enter the day room. On March 9, 1984,
applicant failed to report to his assigned
work. When confronted, applicant falsely
stated that an officer had given him the day
off.
On April 18, 1986, applicant was found to
possess a large quantity of pills for which he
did not have a prescription. On April 23,
1986, when ordered to shave, applicant told
the guard that everyone knew that he had a
shaving pass. When ordered to show the pass,
applicant refused. On October 3, 1986, while
giving inmates their meal, a guard ordered
applicant to move from a bench in the day
room to a table. Applicant stood up, stated
that he “just had to fuck with somebody,” and
then refused an order to return to his bunk.
On January 3, 1987, applicant refused an
order to get a haircut, stating, “I’m not going
to get one.” On January 22, 1987, applicant
was among a group of inmates brought to the
day room and told to sit down facing the wall.
Applicant created a disturbance by jumping
up and yelling, “[F]uck this, we don’t have to
do this,” and trying to get the other inmates
in the day room to join him. When ordered to

sit, applicant repeated, “No! [W]e don’t have
to do this!” As the guard approached him,
applicant returned to the spot where he had
been sitting but refused to sit down.
Ultimately, the guard grabbed applicant by
both arms and placed him face down on the
day-room floor.
On November 17, 1987, a prescription-only
pill was found in applicant’s cell, wrapped in
toilet paper. Applicant did not have a
prescription for the medication. On June 23,
1988, applicant refused an order to shave,
citing a medical condition.
On September 6, 1990, a stinger (an altered
electrical cord used to boil water) was found
in applicant’s cell. On August 12, 1992,
applicant, who was working as a death-row
porter, refused an order to clean up a spill in
the main hallway. He stated that it was not his
job because he was a death-row porter, not a
hall porter. On March 30, 1995, applicant
was found to possess matches and rolling
papers, which inmates were prohibited from
having.
Applicant did not testify at his punishment
retrial. However, the defense called nine of
applicant’s family members to testify about
applicant’s background and the changes they
had seen in applicant since he had been
imprisoned on death row.
Marion Moore, applicant’s mother, testified
that the family had financial problems.
She stated that she worked forty hours per
week outside the home when applicant was
small and that her husband, Junior, worked
construction jobs on and off. She testified
that Junior developed a drinking habit and
would become frustrated with the children
when he had been drinking. Marion testified
that, in December 1971, applicant was hit in
the head by a brick when he was on a school
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bus and that he received medical treatment
for the injury a few days later.
Larry Baker gave testimony similar to that
which he gave at the 1993 evidentiary
hearing concerning Junior’s verbal and
physical abuse of the Moore children.
Regarding Junior’s verbal abuse, Larry
elaborated that Junior treated the male Moore
children differently than the female children.
Larry stated that Junior would tell all of his
sons that they were “worthless” and “no
good.”
When asked to describe what kind of person
applicant was between the ages of thirteen
and seventeen, Larry testified that applicant
was athletic, had a dog and “really had a
special relationship with it,” and “was a quiet
kind of guy sometimes.” Larry asserted that
he had seen changes in applicant since that
time. Larry stated that he “felt initially that
[applicant] was not as intelligent as he ha[d]
displayed lately.” Larry said that applicant
“shows advance [sic] toward intelligence. He
reads a lot. His handwriting is excellent. His
grasp of vocabulary has improved
considerably. His presentation of himself is
much better.”
McNeese testified that the Moore family
moved a lot and that they had been evicted on
one occasion. As to Junior’s physical abuse
of applicant, McNeese gave testimony
similar to that which she gave at the 1993
evidentiary hearing. She again acknowledged
that Junior beat all of the children, but
testified that Junior treated applicant
differently from her other brothers and said
that applicant did not seem like he was
Junior’s son.
McNeese also testified that she and applicant
attended the same schools when they were
young. She said that they first attended
Atherton Elementary, at which the student

body was predominately black. When
applicant was about twelve, as part of a racial
integration effort, they were bussed to
Scroggins Elementary. McNeese testified
that “it was really hard for us to attend
[Scroggins] because the people didn’t want
us there.” She testified that, when they were
first attending Scroggins, applicant was hit in
the head with a brick because the other
students wanted them off the bus. She said
that applicant missed school because of the
brick incident.
McNeese, who is about eleven months
younger than applicant, testified that she and
applicant were placed in the same classroom
at Scroggins so that she could help him.
McNeese stated that applicant did not
respond to the teachers, who did not realize
that he could not read, and he would not
participate in anything. McNeese attributed
applicant’s behavior in class to the fact that
he did not understand what was going on. She
said that she overheard teachers discussing
applicant and asking each other whether he
were intellectually disabled or had a hearing
problem. McNeese testified that when she
was doing seventh-grade-level work, the
teachers would give applicant third-gradelevel work to do, and she would stay after
class to help applicant with it.
McNeese testified that Hester House, a
community center serving Houston’s Fifth
Ward, was a place where she and her siblings
escaped from their situation. McNeese
thought that applicant did better at Hester
House than at school because “[i]t was the
only place where he could really go without
my dad messing with him.” McNeese
testified that applicant learned to swim at
Hester House, became very good at
swimming and enjoyed it, entered into
swimming competitions, and at age thirteen,
won an award for saving a deaf and mute boy
from drowning.
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Paravena Richardson, applicant’s cousin,
testified that she spent a lot of time in the
Moore household as a child and attended
school with applicant and some of his
siblings. Richardson stated that they first
attended Atherton Elementary but then were
bussed to Scroggins Elementary, at which the
student body was primarily Hispanic.
Richardson stated that she was in the same
classes with applicant at Scroggins and that
the Hispanic students there treated him
badly—calling him names, picking fights,
and once hitting applicant in the side of the
face with a brick. Richardson testified that, as
a result of his treatment by the Hispanic
students, applicant was withdrawn in class
and kept to himself.
Richardson said that she had seen Junior,
who was quite controlling and could be set
off by the most minute things, become
physically violent with his children.
Richardson stated that Junior targeted
applicant more than the other boys.
Richardson did not know why and noted that
Junior and applicant’s older brother, Charles,
had almost as poor a relationship.
Applicant’s brother, Lonnie Moore, testified
that he was a couple of years younger than
applicant. When Lonnie was ten years old, he
attended Scroggins Elementary with
applicant. Lonnie testified that he and
applicant were part of a group of students
who were bussed to Scroggins to integrate it.
Lonnie was aware at the time of racial
tensions at Scroggins and of things that
happened to applicant there.
Lonnie stated that his parents treated him and
his younger siblings differently than they
treated the older children. Unlike the older
children, Lonnie and his younger siblings had
to stay in the backyard. They were not
allowed to play out in the streets with friends
and would be watched over by their eldest

sibling, Clara Jean. Lonnie testified that
applicant and his other older brothers were
not subject to the same restrictions. Lonnie
saw Junior physically abuse applicant when
applicant stood up for what he thought was
right, which included protecting their mother
from Junior’s abuse. Lonnie testified that,
due to the tension between applicant and
Junior, applicant was not comfortable or able
to relax at home.
Lonnie testified about gifts that applicant had
made in prison for him, which included:
clocks in the design of a church and a church
cross, a jewelry box, and picture frames.
Lonnie further testified that he had seen a big
change in applicant since applicant had been
on death row. Lonnie thought that applicant
had gained direction and developed
compassion, and noted that they now talked a
lot about religion.
Applicant’s brother, Johnny B. Moore,
testified that he was four years younger than
applicant. Johnny saw Junior hurt applicant,
sometimes for no apparent reason, and at
other times, because applicant was trying to
stop their parents from fighting. When
applicant was still living in the family home,
applicant earned money by cutting grass.
When the children did not have enough to eat,
applicant would use his earnings to help feed
his siblings.
Ronnie Moore, the youngest of applicant’s
brothers, testified that when their parents
were gone, the older children—primarily
applicant, Clara Jean, and McNeese—took
care of the younger children. Ronnie stated
that there was often no food in the house. On
one occasion when applicant and McNeese
were in charge of the younger children and
there was no food, Ronnie saw applicant and
McNeese eating from the neighbors’ trash
cans. He recalled that they contracted food
poisoning.
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Ronnie further testified that applicant worked
on the weekends for a man named Collier,
who mowed lawns, and that applicant also
worked in a rest home. Ronnie testified that
applicant used his earnings to help support
the family. Applicant gave Ronnie money for
lunch and their mother money for bills.
Ronnie testified that, in addition to beating
applicant, Junior would call applicant
“stupid” and “dummy.”
Cloteal Morris, applicant’s mother’s cousin,
testified that applicant was quiet and well
behaved as a young boy, but he was not an
open child and never talked very much. She
stated that applicant had written her beautiful
letters from prison about church and religion.
Alice Moore, applicant’s maternal aunt,
testified that applicant was quiet as a child
and “seemed like a regular kid.” She stated
that applicant wrote letters to her from prison
and described them as “just normal letters.”
The defense also called Jo Ann Cross, a
London solicitor. Cross became acquainted
with applicant through her mother, who
began corresponding with applicant in 1990.
Cross began corresponding with applicant in
1993. Cross testified that applicant’s writing
style, spelling, grammar, and use of language
had all improved during the period of their
correspondence and that it continued to
improve.
Cross further stated that applicant now
showed “a greater deal of understanding of
all sort of issues, be it culture issues [or]
politics” than he had at the beginning of the
correspondence. Cross explained that she had
arranged for applicant to receive newspapers
and articles and that they had discussed these
materials in their correspondence. She
testified that applicant had “absolutely”
demonstrated an ability to understand and
comprehend the events that she was
discussing with him and that he had shown

sympathy and happiness for her when it was
appropriate. After her mother died in 1996,
applicant wrote Cross a very moving letter
about her mother’s death. Applicant had also
made and sent gifts for Cross and her mother,
including a jewelry box with a prayer for
peace inlaid in the lid and a musical jewelry
box.
TDCJ guards testified that, while on death
row, applicant obtained the status of a staffsupport inmate, which allowed him to apply
for jobs within the prison and enjoy certain
privileges during his non-working time.
Applicant’s records showed that he
successfully applied for jobs as a wing porter
and barber and that he also worked in the
shoe and garment factories.
A Harris County Jail guard, Jeff Dixie,
testified that, while applicant had been in jail
awaiting the retrial, he had seen applicant
reading a newspaper. Another Harris County
jailor, Kenneth Wayne Young, testified that
he had written a motivational book, “Wakeup
Call,” and that the chaplain had given a copy
to applicant. Young testified that applicant
read “all the time” and that applicant
introduced newly arrived or troubled jail
inmates to Young’s book.
The defense also called two expert witnesses
to testify, Dee Dee Halpin and Bettina
Wright. Halpin was an educational
diagnostician with a master’s degree in
special education. Wright was a clinical
social worker who held a bachelor’s degree
in psychology and a master’s degree in social
work.
Halpin stated that, at the defense’s request,
she reviewed applicant’s educational records.
These
records
reflected
applicant’s
attendance, conduct and academic grades,
academic achievement test scores, and IQ test
results. Halpin testified that applicant
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attended Atherton Elementary School from
kindergarten through fourth grade. She stated
that there was a recommendation during the
kindergarten year that applicant receive
psychological testing because he was very
withdrawn. Although the person who
recommended testing commented that
intellectual-disability was a possible cause
for applicant’s presentation, that person
thought that emotional problems were the
more likely explanation.
Halpin testified that applicant was promoted
to first grade, but he made very poor grades
that year, especially in all of the language
areas, he tested “poorly” in reading and math
readiness, and his eye-hand coordination was
immature. When applicant was retained a
year in first grade, his grades remained weak,
with the only significant change being that
his conduct grade dropped from “good” to
“needs improvement.” When applicant was
socially promoted to second grade at age
eight, his grades remained about the same.
Applicant attended summer school and was
promoted to third grade, where his poor
grades continued and his conduct dropped to
“unsatisfactory,” the lowest possible conduct
grade. Halpin testified that applicant’s score
that year on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
(ITBS), a group-administered standardized
achievement test, indicated that he was a third
grader performing at a second-grade level.
Halpin testified that applicant was promoted
to fourth grade, but his grades remained poor,
and he continued to perform below grade
level on the ITBS. He was promoted “on
appeal” to fifth grade and began attending a
new
school,
Scroggins
Elementary.
Applicant’s grades improved from Fs to Ds,
and his conduct grades for that year showed
significant improvement. When he took the
ITBS that year, applicant’s math score was
within the average range, although his
language score remained below average.

When noting applicant’s result on the
OLMAT that applicant took that year (77
IQ), Halpin described the OLMAT as a
group-administered IQ test.
Halpin stated that applicant attended a third
elementary school for sixth grade. She
testified that attending three different schools
within three years would be difficult for any
child. Halpin explained that, in the era in
which applicant attended school, the grade in
which certain skills were taught often varied
between schools. As a result, a student who
changed schools frequently in that era might
miss being taught certain skills. In addition,
changing schools disrupted continuity in a
child’s learning and required the student to
make a social adjustment to the new
environment.
Halpin stated that applicant’s ITBS scores for
sixth grade showed him to be performing two
years below grade level. Applicant’s records
also showed that he took a Slosson
Intelligence Test that year, at age thirteen.
Halpin testified that 26 applicant “came out
with a mental age of seven-and-a half and so
his IQ was 57,” which fell within the
intellectually disabled range. But Halpin
noted that the Slosson is an individually
administered IQ test that strongly favors
verbal skills. She asserted that a student with
any kind of language difficulty would
typically perform poorly on the Slosson and
that applicant had consistently shown such
language difficulties. In addition, Halpin
testified that a notation in applicant’s records
stated that his Slosson IQ score of 57 was
“minimal.” Halpin explained that a
“minimal” notation typically meant that the
test administrator felt that the person actually
functioned at a higher level.
Halpin was additionally skeptical of
applicant’s score on the Slosson because he
subsequently
took
the
individually
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administered WISC, which separately
assessed verbal and nonverbal abilities.
Within the overall IQ score of 78 that
applicant obtained on the WISC, he obtained
a verbal IQ score of 77 and a nonverbal or
performance IQ score of 83. Halpin testified
that, according to his school records,
applicant remained in a regular classroom
following the WISC testing.

Wright testified that applicant’s drug use
exacerbated his difficulties in school.
Applicant told Wright that he began to use
drugs in fifth grade to “escape the pain.” He
began by using marijuana. By the time he was
of junior-high and high-school age, Wright
testified, applicant was using marijuana,
alcohol, amphetamines, tranquilizers, and
whatever else he could obtain.

Halpin testified that she had also reviewed a
letter that applicant had recently written.
She stated that, although the letter contained
some errors, the language was “certainly
coherent,” “fairly complex,” and “adult[]like.” Based on all the materials she
reviewed, Halpin opined that applicant
functioned in the low-average range of
intellectual functioning and that he
“definitely had some ability to learn that
wasn’t tapped early in his school years.”

In closing argument, defense counsel
emphasized applicant’s background. Defense
counsel asserted that applicant did so poorly
in school that he “was considered to be
possibly [intellectually disabled].” But
counsel asserted that “we learned later from
the experts and other people who looked at
[applicant’s school records] that he wasn’t
really [intellectually disabled] at all, he was
capable of learning.” Counsel argued that
“mostly what [applicant’s] young life was
about” was “lack of food, violence in the
home[,] and one failure after another in
school. . . . It was a cycle of violence in which
there was no peace and no safety in the
home.” Counsel asserted that, in addition to
physically abusing applicant, Junior Moore
emotionally abused applicant by conveying
the idea that he “wasn’t any good, he wasn’t
smart, [and] he couldn’t learn.” Counsel
argued that applicant “[was] not retarded, he
was just treated like somebody that was
retarded” and that it was not until applicant
“[went] to prison[,] away from his family
environment that [he was] actually safe
enough to be able to learn and grow and
become the kind of person that he could have
become had he come from a safe
environment.”

Wright testified that she had reviewed
applicant’s educational records and Dr.
Borda’s 1993 evidentiary hearing testimony.
She also interviewed applicant twice, for a
total of four hours. Wright concluded that
applicant “was nowhere near retarded.” She
opined that applicant had an average IQ and
that his ability to learn was “very intact.”
Wright attributed applicant’s difficulties in
school to undiagnosed learning disabilities
and emotional problems. She opined that his
emotional problems stemmed from his
learning disabilities, academic failure, and
self-described “scary” childhood. She
concluded that the quietness and constrained
movement noted in applicant’s records were
due to his fear rather than to any diminished
intellectual functioning. She explained that
applicant was a very vigilant and watchful
child who carefully assessed situations before
acting.

The trial court charged the jury pursuant to
Article 37.0711. On February 14, 2001, in
accordance with the jury’s answers to the
special issues, the trial court again sentenced
applicant to death.
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E. Direct Appeal from 2001 Punishment
Retrial
Robert Morrow, applicant’s punishmentretrial counsel, also represented applicant on
the automatic direct appeal to this Court. See
Art. 37.0711, § 3(g). On August 20, 2002,
Morrow filed a brief on applicant’s behalf.
On the same date, he filed “Appellant’s
Motion To Stay Proceedings Under [Atkins]
Pending Legislative Action, As An
Alternative To Relief Requested In
Appellant’s Brief.” Despite having argued at
the punishment retrial that applicant was not
intellectually disabled and having presented
the testimony of two experts to support that
theory, Morrow now asserted that applicant
“ha[d] a strong claim of [intellectualdisability]” under the June 2002 Supreme
Court opinion in Atkins. Morrow urged us to
stay applicant’s direct appeal until the Texas
Legislature enacted legislation to implement
Atkins’s mandate. We denied the motion on
September 11, 2002.
On October 3, 2002, applicant filed a pro se
“Motion for Leave to File Appellant’s [Pro
Se] Supplemental Brief.” In the motion,
applicant acknowledged that he was not
entitled to hybrid representation, but stated
that he wished to file a supplemental pro se
brief to raise an additional point of error. In
his pro se supplemental brief, applicant
argued
that
Article
37.0711
was
unconstitutional because it implicitly placed
the burden on the defendant to show that
sufficient mitigating factors exist to warrant
a life sentence rather than death. We denied
applicant’s motion on October 4, 2002, and
later affirmed his sentence.
II. Current Habeas Proceedings
A. Applicant’s Application and Supporting
Exhibits

On June 17, 2003, through appointed habeas
counsel Stephen Morris, applicant filed his
current application pursuant to Article
11.071. In support of his request for an
evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim,
applicant attached affidavits executed in
2003 by Gina Vitale, a social worker and his
mitigation investigator, and Dr. Richard
Garnett, a clinical psychologist. Vitale and
Garnett each asserted that there was
sufficient
evidence
of
applicant’s
intellectual-disability, as defined in the tenth
(2002) edition of the AAMR Manual or the
DSM-IV, or both, to warrant an evidentiary
hearing. According to their affidavits,
although Vitale interviewed applicant’s
relatives, neither Vitale nor Garnett
personally assessed applicant. Instead, they
based their opinions on their review of
Vitale’s interviews with applicant’s family;
affidavits and interview notes compiled by
applicant’s previous defense team; and some
of applicant’s records. Neither Vitale nor
Garnett actually diagnosed applicant as
intellectually disabled.
Vitale discounted applicant’s 77 IQ score on
the OLMAT, describing that instrument as a
state-mandated, group-administered IQ
screening tool, and she emphasized the 57 IQ
score that he obtained on the Slosson. Vitale
acknowledged applicant’s WISC score (78
IQ), but asserted that his mental age scores on
the concurrently administered Bender Gestalt
and Goodenough tests reflected much lower
IQ scores of 67 and 71, respectively.
Garnett stated that the OLMAT is a group test
that requires one to read. Due to evidence of
applicant’s inability to read, Garnett
questioned the validity of applicant’s
OLMAT score. Garnett also asserted that
applicant obtained a 67 IQ score on the
Bender Gestalt and a 72 IQ score on the
Goodenough test that he took in conjunction
with the 1973 WISC.
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B. Applicant’s Pro Se Requests to Waive
Further Appeals
The State filed an original answer in
December 2003, followed by a supplemental
answer in January 2004. On June 23, 2005,
direct appeal counsel Morrow wrote to the
current habeas judge, stating:
It is my understanding that you
recently received a request from
[applicant] to discontinue his appeals
and or [sic] pending writs. I received
the
same
request.
However,
immediately after that, I received
instruction from [applicant] that he no
longer wishes to withdraw his writs or
appeals. [Applicant] is dealing with
the stress of Death Row and was
understandably upset when he wrote
the first letter. [Applicant] wants to
continue his post-conviction efforts.
Despite Morrow’s assertions, on October 3,
2005, applicant filed a “Pro Se Ex Parte
Motion to Waive Further Appeal” in the trial
court. Applicant correctly stated that he had
been sentenced to death on February 14,
2001, after a new punishment trial; that the
trial court had subsequently appointed
Morrow to represent him on direct appeal;
and that it had appointed Morris to prepare a
post-conviction application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Applicant moved the trial
court to dismiss Morrow and Morris, to find
that he waived further appeals of his capitalmurder conviction and death sentence, and to
set his execution date.
On May 30, 2006, the current habeas judge
held a hearing concerning applicant’s pro se
motion. Direct-appeal counsel Morrow
appeared on behalf of applicant, who, by the
parties’ agreement, was not present. The
court stated that, in response to applicant’s
2005 letter and motion, it had ordered him

moved from death row to the Harris County
Jail for a psychological examination to
determine his competency to withdraw his
application. The court further stated that, as
of the 2006 hearing date, applicant had been
at the jail for sixty-nine days but had refused
to speak with doctors. Therefore, the court
said, no psychological examination could be
completed. Counsel for both parties agreed to
the court’s factual recitation. Because no
psychological examination could be
completed, the court ordered applicant’s
habeas proceeding to continue, directed that
he be returned to death row, and instructed
Morrow to write to applicant to explain why
the court could not proceed with the pro se
motion.
C. Applicant’s Supplemental Filings in
Support of His Atkins Claim
In 2009, current writ counsel, Pat McCann,
substituted for Morris, who was permitted to
withdraw. In late 2011, McCann filed a
lengthy “Factual Supplement” in support of
applicant’s Atkins allegation. The Factual
Supplement included documents that
appeared to be notes taken by applicant’s
1992 writ and 2001 punishment-retrial
defense-team members, specifically, Kristi
Franklin Hyatt, Anthony S. Haughton,
Patrick Moran, and Jemma Levinson. The
notes memorialized their interviews with
applicant, various relatives, and Dr. Borda.
According to those notes, on November 14,
1991, applicant told Haughton that Junior
Moore physically terrorized and abused
applicant’s mother and siblings just as badly
as he did applicant; applicant was a slow
learner who did not do well in school; and
due to family moves and racial integration
efforts, he attended several different schools.
Applicant said that, when he dropped out of
school around age fifteen or sixteen, he could
barely read and started living “a street life.”
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He had his first drink at age thirteen, and
before going to prison at age seventeen, he
regularly abused alcohol and drugs. In juniorhigh school, he started smoking marijuana
and taking 7 to 14 Quaalude pills per day, and
he tried methamphetamine. Applicant also
reported that, after his first stint in prison, he
started cooking and injecting “preludes.”
Applicant stated that he got stoned regularly,
often combining preludes, marijuana, and
alcohol.
According to the notes, in April 1993 (i.e.,
before the 1993 evidentiary hearing), Borda
told Hyatt that he did not consider applicant
intellectually disabled, although he believed
that physical abuse, neglect, and substance
abuse may have affected applicant’s mental
status at the time of the offense. Because
applicant had never been tested for a
personality disorder, Borda told Hyatt that he
could not rule out schizophrenia or
personality disorders. However, Borda said
that he felt comfortable describing applicant
as having at least below average intelligence,
a learning disorder, and compromised social
development. Borda believed that applicant
had some sort of brain dysfunction, possibly
from a frontallobe injury, which would result
in a lack of impulse control and a diminished
ability to think through the consequences of
his actions. But Borda acknowledged to
Hyatt that amphetamine abuse could cause
“this personality defect.”
The notes in applicant’s Factual Supplement
indicated that defense-team members
interviewed applicant four times in 2000.
Moran interviewed applicant in February and
March of that year. During the interviews,
applicant stated that his mother, Marion,
would send him to look for Junior, who was
often absent. Applicant would usually find
Junior drunk and with another woman.
Applicant observed that it probably angered
Junior for applicant to find him in such a
compromising position and that Junior may

have beaten applicant harder than the other
children to deter him from telling Marion.
Applicant stated that, after being
permanently thrown out of the house, he
could have stayed with nearby friends. But
because applicant felt ashamed, he instead
spent the first night in a neighbor’s garage.
Applicant said that his earlier period of
incarceration would show two disciplinary
matters. One was for making gambling dice
from paper and soap. The other was for
fighting a bullying inmate named “Cadillac.”
Applicant recalled that he had been in the day
room talking to an inmate who was known as
an easy rape victim. When Cadillac began
taunting both of them, a fight ensued.
Applicant said that a guard who witnessed the
incident corroborated his assertion of selfdefense.
Jemma Levinson interviewed applicant twice
in May 2000. According to her notes,
applicant stated that he looked after his older
brother, Charles, who sometimes got into
trouble when drinking, and that he broke up
fights between Charles and their brother
Jessie. Applicant also said that it fell to him
and his sister, Clara Jean, to look after the
younger siblings. At school, applicant’s
sister, Colleen, told him that a boy was
bothering her. Applicant told the boy to leave
Colleen alone and fought with him.
Applicant described himself to Levinson as
the kid in the neighborhood that everyone
liked and recalled that he would clean houses
and cut yards. Applicant told Levinson that,
when he was around eleven or twelve years
old, he would sneak out of the house between
1:00 and 2:00 a.m. to see friends. Applicant
said that he lacked guidance and became
attracted to “things on the street.”
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Applicant also stated that he did not do well
in school, did not like it, and was frustrated
by his inability to read or write. To escape
class, at first he would go to the school nurse,
pretending to be sick. He started skipping
school in fourth grade, skipped school a few
times in sixth grade, and by seventh grade,
almost entirely stopped going. Applicant told
Levinson that he also started drinking in the
seventh grade.
Applicant reported that, in seventh grade, he
wanted to be a football or baseball player and
tried out for school sports teams, but he had
to stop playing when he ran over a wire
hanger while mowing lawns and suffered a
cut to his leg. The hospital put a cast on his
leg, which he ultimately removed himself
because he was determined to walk on his
leg. Applicant said that he met his first
girlfriend at school and that he would sneak
from his house at night to see her. Applicant
stated that he got into trouble at school for
fighting and had a reputation for it, such that
people wanted to fight with him. Applicant
thought that the fights came about because he
was shy and did not know how to
communicate.
Applicant also told Levinson that he began
hanging around the pool hall, where he
learned to gamble and steal. Another guy
around his same age showed him how to
shoot pool, rob people, steal cars, and break
into houses. Applicant told Levinson that he
later began doing those things on his own.
Applicant further stated that he started
injecting preludes when he was between
fifteen and sixteen years old, but he later
stopped because it scared him, and he knew
that he would end up dead or doing
something that he would regret. Applicant
also stopped drinking alcohol after seeing the
effect it had on him, but he continued
smoking marijuana. Applicant reported that

he paid for drugs with money that he made
from stealing and selling cars, breaking into
houses, and hustling pool.
Applicant also told Levinson that during his
earlier period of incarceration, he made
friends with an inmate named Swan.
Applicant and Swan would stay out of the day
room to avoid the fights that frequently
occurred there. Instead, he and Swan would
play dominoes elsewhere and applicant had a
disciplinary report for one of those occasions.
Applicant recalled that, around 1997, he went
through “a bad period” on death row, during
which all he did was sleep and gain weight.
Applicant further told Levinson that he had
ordered and read a book written by a jail
officer.
The notes contained in applicant’s Factual
Supplement indicate that Moran and
Levinson separately interviewed Clara Jean
Baker in 2000. According to those notes,
Clara Jean reported that both of applicant’s
parents regularly beat all of the children
except for her. Clara Jean recalled that, as
applicant grew older, he would intervene
when his parents fought, causing Junior to
throw him out. Clara Jean said that applicant
knew about Junior’s many extramarital
affairs and that Junior was always angry with
applicant for catching him in infidelity. Clara
Jean further stated that applicant and their
brother, Jessie, would sneak out of the house.
In his early years, applicant was quiet, shy,
and did not spend much time with other
people, but otherwise was happy, artistic, and
always working. In summer, applicant would
cut yards all day until Marion came home.
Applicant liked wearing nice things and
cared a lot about his appearance. Clara Jean
recalled that applicant had a girlfriend at
school named Robin, who was “very cute,”
and other boys envied him because of it.
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The notes also indicate that Levinson
interviewed Larry Baker in 2000. Larry
reported that, as a child, applicant was
“personable and impressionable, . . . a very
good athlete,” liked animals, was obedient,
attended school, and “was just the same as the
rest of us.” Applicant trained the Moore
family’s dog and put on “shows” with the
animal. The dog was very well trained and
did whatever applicant said. Larry recalled
that applicant followed clothing trends, was
pleasant and well-mannered, and was always
helpful, doing odd jobs and selling
newspapers. He described applicant as
enterprising and having a lot of friends. As
they grew older, Larry started noticing
changes in applicant’s choice of associates
and in applicant’s attitude towards attaining
things. Larry stated that applicant developed
the attitude that he did not want to work his
whole life and have nothing. Larry told
Levinson that applicant always looked neat
and tidy, had good hygiene, and worked in a
fish market and cut grass to buy his clothes.
D. Appointment of Mental-health Experts
The current habeas court appointed mentalhealth experts for both parties in anticipation
of the 2014 evidentiary hearing. Dr. Borda
again assisted applicant, as did Dr. Shawanda
Williams Anderson, a clinical neuropsychologist, and Dr. Stephen Greenspan, a
retired professor of educational psychology.
Dr. Kristi Compton, a clinical and forensic
psychologist, assisted the State. Before the
hearing, habeas counsel filed Borda’s
affidavit
and
Anderson’s
“Forensic
Neuropsychological Report.”
According to her report, on November 22,
2013, and December 6, 2013, over a period
of four hours, Anderson conducted an initial
diagnostic interview of applicant at TDCJ’s
Polunsky Unit and administered various
neuropsychological tests to him. She

thereafter interviewed applicant’s family
members for approximately two hours. On
December 19, 2013, Anderson administered
math subtests of the WAIS-IV and Wide
Range Achievement Test-4 (WRAT-4) to
applicant at the Harris County Jail, solely to
determine his computational ability.
According to Borda’s affidavit, he
administered “a very limited test battery” to
applicant on December 12, 2013. That
battery consisted of three neuropsychological
tests and one formal measure of IQ, a
Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices
(RCPM) test. Applicant obtained an IQ score
of 85 on the RCPM.
On January 1, 2014, Compton conducted a
six-hour assessment of applicant. After
interviewing applicant about his personal
history, she administered a Test of Memory
Malingering (TOMM); a WAIS–IV; a
Wechsler Memory Scales, 4th Edition; a
complete WRAT-4; and a Texas Functional
Living Scales, a test of adaptive functioning.
Applicant obtained a full scale IQ score of 59
on the WAIS-IV.
E. January 2014 Evidentiary Hearing
Lonnie Moore, Colleen McNeese, Larry
Baker,
Mark
Fronkiewicz,
Borda,
Greenspan, and Anderson testified for
applicant at the 2014 evidentiary hearing.
Through applicant’s relatives, applicant
again presented evidence of Junior’s
alcoholism and physical abuse, the family’s
limited financial means, and applicant’s poor
grades and reading difficulties.
Lonnie Moore testified that applicant was
shy, quiet, and athletically talented as a child,
especially at swimming, but he received poor
grades in school and never read well. While
still living with the family, applicant made
money in the summer by cutting grass and
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helping a man with household projects. After
being thrown out of the house, applicant
worked at the Galleria for a place that sold
sausages.
Lonnie and McNeese testified that their
mother, Marion, cooked the family’s meals
on a hot plate and that the family did not have
kitchen appliances such as a microwave
oven. McNeese asserted that applicant did
not know how to cook and did not help
prepare food. However, McNeese and Lonnie
both testified that only the female children
were enlisted to help Marion with meal
preparation.
McNeese had testified at applicant’s 1993
evidentiary hearing and his 2001 punishment
retrial. She now remembered that the incident
on the school bus, in which applicant was hit
in the head with a brick, was a much more
violent event than she had described in her
prior testimony, asserting that it involved the
bus being set on fire with Malotov-cocktaillike devices. McNeese also now remembered
that, when applicant was in second and third
grade, he could not tell a $1 bill from a $5 or
$10 bill, was not allowed to go places by
himself because he did not know how much
change he was supposed to receive, and that
she had to accompany him and handle the
money. But McNeese acknowledged that,
after he learned to read, applicant was able to
distinguish the denominations on bills.
McNeese also acknowledged that she had
recently received letters from applicant and
that his counting, reading, and writing ability
had
greatly
improved
since
his
imprisonment.
Through McNeese, habeas counsel attempted
to show that Junior treated applicant more
harshly than his siblings and that he did so
because he perceived applicant to be
intellectually disabled. Habeas counsel
elicited testimony from McNeese that Junior

was more cruel to applicant than to her other
siblings. McNeese stated that Junior would
call applicant “dumb,” bend applicant’s hand
back, and whip him when applicant could not
spell words or read on command. McNeese
stated that Junior would get especially angry
when school representatives visited the house
to say that applicant needed help. McNeese
testified that she was present when Junior
“ran off” two such representatives, one of
whom suggested that applicant was
intellectually disabled and needed a different
educational setting. But McNeese stated that,
at the time, she did not think that applicant
was intellectually disabled. She also testified
that, while applicant was “left behind” in
school, he was always in regular classrooms.
In contrast to her 2001 testimony that
applicant functioned better and participated
more when he was at places like Hester
House, where Junior “could[n’t] . . . [mess]
with him,” McNeese now asserted that
applicant functioned the same whether Junior
was present or absent.
Contrary to his earlier statements, Larry
Baker now remembered that applicant was
the slowest kid in a group of neighborhood
boys who played sports together and that the
other boys teased applicant for being a
“dummy” until Larry made them stop. Larry
testified that, when they played football,
applicant could not follow verbal play
instructions very well and that Larry had to
diagram plays in the dirt for him. When they
played baseball, he had to repeatedly tell
applicant not to sling the bat. Larry also now
remembered that people tried to take
advantage of applicant, although he recalled
that applicant would stand up for himself.
Although Larry did not dispute his 2001
testimony concerning the advances applicant
had made while in prison, he asserted that
applicant’s letters did not reflect a mature,
thoughtful person with a normal state of
mind.
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Through the testimony of Mark Fronkiewicz,
who acknowledged that he had an extensive
criminal record and was on parole for murder
at the time of the hearing, habeas counsel
attempted to minimize the evidence of
applicant’s many pro se filings and other
writings included in the record. Fronkiewicz
testified that he spent 1988 to 1993 on death
row, before inmates received appointed
counsel, and he worked as a writ writer,
assisting inmates with legal and personal
correspondence and writ preparation.
Fronkiewicz stated that he recognized
applicant from death row, but had never
talked to him. Fronkiewicz asserted that
David Harris was another writ writer on death
row when Fronkiewicz was there.
Fronkiewicz said that Harris sought his
assistance on a pro se writ that Harris was
preparing for applicant. Fronkiewicz
remembered discussing applicant’s case with
Harris, but could not recall the date.
Borda, who acknowledged in his 2013
affidavit that forensic psychology “is not
[his] specialty,” testified that he now
concluded that applicant met the criteria for a
intellectual disability diagnosis. In forming
his current opinion, Borda relied on: the
records he reviewed in preparation for his
1993
evidentiary-hearing
testimony;
unspecified other medical records and
affidavits provided by current writ counsel;
unspecified other records, provided by
unspecified other sources; “some family
history”; Vitale’s and Garnett’s affidavits;
Anderson’s written report; the 2014
evidentiary hearing testimony of applicant’s
relatives; and his own “really . . . very, very
brief” assessment of applicant in December
2013, which did not involve giving applicant
“a [full scale] IQ test.” Borda acknowledged
that he did not know much about the offense
and had not read applicant’s confession or
trial testimony. Borda asserted that Vitale,

Garnett, and Anderson had also diagnosed
applicant as intellectually disabled.
Greenspan testified that he had a practice
related to diagnosing intellectual disability in
the forensic setting and that he performed the
vast majority of his work for defense
attorneys. In the roughly fourteen years since
the Atkins decision, he had actually
performed 10 to 12 clinical evaluations for
intellectual disability and diagnosed
intellectual disability in about two-thirds of
them. Greenspan further testified that his
clinical evaluations are not comprehensive
because he focuses on the adaptive-deficits
criterion. Greenspan stated that he taught IQ
courses many years ago, but when working in
his clinical capacity, at most, he only
occasionally administers an IQ screening
test. When determining whether a defendant
satisfies the sub-average intellectualfunctioning criterion, Greenspan relies on IQ
test scores in the defendant’s records. If none
exist, then he requests that someone who is
“more current” with IQ testing conduct such
testing.
Greenspan stated that he was testifying in
applicant’s case as a teaching expert and
acknowledged never having met or
communicated with applicant. Greenspan
also acknowledged that he had not read the
transcript of either of applicant’s two trials.
Although Greenspan did not offer a
diagnosis, he testified that he had no reason
to doubt Borda’s intellectual-disability
diagnosis and saw no basis for any other
diagnosis.
Anderson testified that current writ counsel
originally asked her to determine whether
applicant was born with a brain anomaly
(“organicity”) or evidenced a traumatic brain
injury (TBI). To make those two
determinations,
Anderson
reviewed
unspecified school and medical records that
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current writ counsel provided, conducted an
initial diagnostic interview, and administered
various neuropsychological tests. Anderson
testified that the neuropsychological tests she
gave were not IQ tests.
Anderson stated that applicant’s scores on the
tests she gave indicated language deficits,
slowed processing speed (but an intact
memory), and problems with reasoning and
judgment. Anderson testified that applicant’s
verbal memory score fell in the low-average
range, reflected a weakness in his ability to
acquire words (versus the ability to recall
them once learned), and implicated his
capacity to learn. She stated that applicant’s
scores
on the
executive-functioning
assessments she gave were all in the “severe”
range.
Anderson testified that, after she conveyed
her findings on organicity and TBI to current
writ counsel, he asked her to review the
criteria for intellectual disability. Anderson
testified that she has made intellectualdisability determinations at least a few times
in her practice. Anderson stated that, in
making
her
intellectual-disability
determination, she did not conduct any
further evaluation except for a two-hour
group interview of applicant’s relatives.
Anderson opined that applicant would meet
the DSM-IV’s and AAIDD’s criteria for
intellectual disability.
Jerry LeBlanc and Compton testified for the
State at the 2014 evidentiary hearing.
LeBlanc testified that he had worked at the
Polunsky Unit’s commissary for fourteen
years and and personally dealt with the
commissary on a daily basis. LeBlanc
explained the procedure by which death-row
inmates request commissary items, described
the kind of mathematical computations
required to successfully complete a
commissary form, and described his

interactions with applicant
commissary transactions.

regarding

While looking at applicant’s commissary
records, LeBlanc testified to specific, recent
examples of applicant having correctly
computed multiple-unit order totals and
having composed orders that came within 5¢
of the $85 limit. In one example, applicant
used his funds to purchase fifteen postage
stamps. LeBlanc also noted two examples of
applicant having requested substitute items
(one being a request for aspirin or dental floss
in place of ibuprofen). LeBlanc testified that
he did not help applicant complete
commissary forms, and to his knowledge, no
one else did. LeBlanc asserted that the
commissary’s price list changed frequently
and that, although there was another cell
adjacent to applicant’s, the unit moved deathrow inmates frequently, and thus, applicant
did not have the same neighbor for significant
periods.
LeBlanc additionally testified about his
interactions with applicant regarding
commissary transactions. LeBlanc stated that
he and applicant had discussed what the
commissary carried and whether it had
correctly filled applicant’s order. When the
commissary had charged applicant for
undelivered or damaged items, applicant had
noticed, brought it to LeBlanc’s attention,
and been able to discuss the discrepancy or
damage. LeBlanc had never received the
impression that applicant was unable to
understand what was going on with his
commissary order or that he was unable to
respond to LeBlanc’s questions.
Compton stated that she had testified as an
expert over seventy times and had conducted
over 3,000 forensic evaluations, with about
50% of her work having been directly for the
courts, 40% for defense attorneys, and 10%
for the State. In preparation for her testimony,
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Compton reviewed applicant’s school
records; past psychological testing results;
TDCJ records (including commissary and
disciplinary records); transcripts from
applicant’s 1980 trial (including applicant’s
testimony), 1983 Faretta hearing, and 2001
punishment retrial (including Halpin and
Wright’s expert testimony); letters from
applicant to his attorney and others; motions
filed by applicant; and recent photographs of
items inside applicant’s cell. Compton also
personally
assessed
applicant
by
interviewing him and administering
standardized tests, including effort tests.
Compton additionally attended the entire
evidentiary hearing and listened to the other
witnesses’ testimony.
Compton testified that the data she reviewed
did not support an intellectual-disability
diagnosis. Based on applicant’s FlynnEffect-adjusted scores on IQ tests that she
considered valid, Compton concluded that
there was a greater probability than not that
applicant’s intellectual functioning fell
within the borderline range. But Compton
noted that, when the standard error of
measurement was applied to the mean of his
valid, Flynn-Effect-adjusted IQ scores, the
lower end of the scoring range could dip into
the mild intellectual-disability range.
Nevertheless,
Compton
opined
that
applicant’s level of adaptive functioning had
been too great, even before he went to prison,
to support an intellectual-disability diagnosis.
After receiving the habeas court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law recommending
that we grant relief on applicant’s Atkins
claim, we filed and set the case to consider
that allegation.
III. Analysis
To prevail on the allegation that he is
intellectually
disabled
for
Eighth

Amendment purposes and, therefore, exempt
from execution, applicant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) he
suffers from significantly sub-average
general intellectual functioning, generally
shown by an IQ of 70 or less; (2) his
significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning is accompanied by significant
and related limitations in adaptive
functioning; and (3) the onset of the above
two characteristics occurred before the age of
eighteen.
A. Significantly Sub-average
Intellectual Functioning

General

Applicant has failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has
significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning. The IQ scores before us are: a 77
IQ score obtained by applicant in 1971 (age
12) on the OLMAT; a 57 IQ score obtained
in 1972 (age 13) on the Slosson; a 78 IQ score
obtained in 1973 (age 13) on the WISC; an
estimated full scale IQ score of 71 obtained
in 1984 (age 30) on an abbreviated WAIS-R;
a 74 IQ score obtained in 1989 (age thirty) on
a complete WAIS-R; an 85 IQ score obtained
in 2013 (age 54) on the RCPM administered
by Dr. Borda; and a 59 IQ score obtained in
2014 (age 54) on the WAIS-IV administered
by Dr. Compton. Applicant also asks us to
rely on the IQ scores that Borda and Garnett
derived from the mental-age scores that he
obtained in 1973 (age 13) on the Bender
Gestalt and Goodenough tests administered
by Marcelle
Tucker.
At the 2014 evidentiary hearing, Borda
identified the 57 IQ score on the Slosson as
the first and most accurate assessment of
applicant’s IQ. Borda reached 39 that
conclusion because, due to “practice effects
in IQ testing, usually the most accurate
assessment is the first test that’s done.” He
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also cited applicant’s lack of incentive to do
poorly. Borda initially acknowledged that,
like the RCPM, the Slosson is a groupadministered test and not one that is widely
used. On further redirect examination, Borda
asserted that, like the RCPM, the Slosson
could also be individually administered, but
he acknowledged that the Slosson was not a
test that he would use.
Borda discounted applicant’s 78 IQ score on
the WISC. First, Borda asserted that
applicant’s WISC score should be adjusted to
70 for the Flynn Effect. Second, Borda noted
that applicant contemporaneously took
Bender Gestalt and Goodenough tests.
Although he acknowledged that the Bender
Gestalt and Goodenough tests are not IQ
tests, Borda explained that he used
applicant’s mental-age scores on those
instruments to derive IQ scores. Borda stated
that he calculated an IQ score of 67 on the
Bender Gestalt and an unspecified IQ score
on the Goodenough. He then adjusted both
derived scores for the Flynn Effect, arriving
at a 56 IQ for the Bender Gestalt and a “mid60s” IQ score for the Goodenough. Borda
testified that the derived, Flynn-Effectadjusted IQ scores on the Bender Gestalt and
Goodenough tests indicated that the WISC
score overstated applicant’s level of
intellectual functioning.
Borda also discounted applicant’s 74 IQ
score on the 1989 WAIS-R, asserting that it
should be adjusted to 71 for the Flynn Effect.
Borda asserted that applicant’s 85 IQ score
on the RCPM could be artificially high due to
the practice effect because the RCPM is very
similar to the matrices portion of the
Wechsler Scale IQ tests. But Borda
acknowledged that, when he gave the RCPM,
applicant had not been subjected to any
meaningful IQ testing for over a decade.
Borda also acknowledged that the AAIDD is
the commonly accepted national authority on

intellectual disability and that, per the
AAIDD, the practice effect is nonexistent
after seven years.
Borda acknowledged that he did not conduct
effort testing when he assessed applicant.
Borda asserted that no good effort test exists
for people with below-average IQs because
most such tools gauge memory; therefore,
people with memory problems will not score
well on them. He also testified that effort tests
are not normed for the below-average IQ
population. Borda further asserted that, for a
person with as much experience as he
possessed, any malingering would be
obvious from simple observation. But Borda
denied taking the position in his testimony
that effort testing is inapplicable to
intellectually disabled people.
Borda agreed that applicant had a difficult
childhood, describing it as “a horrible
background” in which “a very authoritarian
father” created “a very dependent” and
“fearful” child. Although he acknowledged
that applicant’s childhood environment did
not help his intellectual development, Borda
asserted that applicant was “very limited” to
begin with. Borda acknowledged that a
learning disability is not the same as
intellectual disability and that emotional
disturbances (including depression) and
environmental conditions (including living in
an abusive household or having parents who
are not intellectually curious) can adversely
affect a person’s learning ability and IQ
scores. Borda also acknowledged that facing
the death penalty could adversely affect
motivation or cause depression and
negatively affect test performance.
Borda acknowledged that others testified that
applicant had done well and improved his
academic skills while on death row.
However, Borda did not find this testimony
persuasive. Borda concluded that applicant
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was able to develop these skills on death row
because he had abundant time to practice
very specific and essentially unchanging
tasks.
Greenspan disregarded applicant’s 77 IQ
score on the OLMAT, asserting that the
OLMAT is a group-administered test. He
stated that group-administered tests are not
comprehensive and do not yield a full-scale
measure of intelligence. Greenspan also
discounted applicant’s 57 IQ score on the
Slosson. Greenspan testified that, while the
Slosson could be individually administered,
it is a screening test that is not as
comprehensive as the WISC and it is not
considered a gold-standard test for diagnostic
purposes. Greenspan also stated that the
version of the Slosson test given to applicant
derived IQ scores by the unreliable and nowabandoned ratio method that compared
chronological and mental age. He testified
that the Slosson is now scored using the more
valid statistical-deviation method. Greenspan
further indicated that the degree of statistical
deviation from the mean is the currently
accepted method of evaluating an
individual’s intellectual functioning.
Greenspan testified that the Wechsler scale is
considered the gold standard. But Greenspan
testified that applicant’s 78 IQ score on the
WISC should be reduced for the Flynn Effect
to below 70, if applicant took the original
WISC, or to between 70 and 71, if applicant
took the WISC-R. Greenspan testified that,
even without correcting for the Flynn Effect,
the standard error of measurement (SEM)
meant that applicant’s WISC score could
have been as low as 73. But Greenspan also
volunteered that the score obtained on the
WISC by someone who, like applicant, came
from a poor, African-American family could
underestimate the actual level of intellectual
functioning.

Greenspan testified that the WAIS-IV is the
current gold standard for IQ tests, and he
emphasized that applicant obtained an IQ
score of 59 on the WAIS-IV that Dr.
Compton had recently administered.
Although he had earlier testified that
applicant’s Slosson score was unreliable,
Greenspan emphasized that applicant’s
WAIS-IV score was almost identical to
applicant’s Slosson score.
On direct examination, Greenspan testified
that the validity of effort tests for people in
the intellectually disabled range had not been
adequately established. Greenspan asserted
that the two best indicators of effort for
intellectually disabled people are (1) the
clinical judgment of an experienced
evaluator; and (2) whether current test results
are congruent with past test results, especially
on tests given when the subject had no
incentive to do poorly. Based on the
testimony given at the 2014 evidentiary
hearing by applicant’s relatives, Greenspan
concluded that a lack of ability was a more
likely explanation for applicant’s poor test
scores than a lack of good effort.
On cross-examination, however, Greenspan
acknowledged that the recommended
practice in forensic psychology is to conduct
effort testing, especially when one is
administering
cognitive
measures.
Greenspan denied taking the position, on
direct examination, that effort testing is less
applicable to someone with intellectual
disability. He clarified that the results of
effort tests given to intellectually disabled
people are more difficult to interpret, because
of problems validating effort tests for low IQ
individuals. Greenspan agreed that it is
important to analyze the results of IQ testing
to ensure validity, especially when an
external motive to exaggerate symptoms
might exist. Greenspan also agreed that, for
many people, facing the death penalty would
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be a significant external motivating factor.
Greenspan volunteered that “there are all
kinds of reasons why someone would give a
poor effort and one of them is if you have a
history of failure in academic settings[;] you
might go too quickly or you might not give
optimal effort because you just assume it’s
not going to make any difference.”

Compton noted that applicant’s IQ might be
higher than his Flynn-Effect-adjusted WISC
score because family reports suggested that
he was traumatized as a child by paternal
abuse. Compton explained that childhood
trauma can cause low IQ scores because the
stressful environment makes it difficult for
the child to get enough rest, focus, and learn.

Anderson did not administer any IQ testing
when she examined applicant. She did not
testify about the reliability of any particular
IQ test or IQ score reflected in the record.
She acknowledged that factors unrelated to a
person’s actual mental ability can lower test
scores, including depression, psychosis, and
external motivations to obtain a lower score,
such as facing the death penalty.

Compton, who testified that she had worked
in a prison system, doubted the validity of
applicant’s IQ scores on TDCJ-administered
tests because prison IQ assessments do not
typically include effort testing. Compton
asserted that effort testing is important when
assessing cognitive deficits because, if the
subject is not exerting effort, the assessment
will inaccurately represent his ability.

Compton disregarded applicant’s OLMAT
and Slosson scores, stating that those
instruments were group tests and lacked high
validity. Compton indicated that applicant’s
1972 Slosson score was particularly
problematic due to research suggesting that,
in the 1970s, the Slosson had extremely poor
validity in determining intellectual disability.
Compton also disregarded the Bender Gestalt
and Goodenough tests because they were
neuropsychological screening instruments
rather than IQ tests.

Compton also stated that many inmates are
depressed and that depression can lower IQ
scores. Although TDCJ never formally
diagnosed applicant with depression, he
exhibited withdrawn and depressive behavior
throughout his time on death row, and he
demonstrated similar behavior earlier in his
life. Compton also noted a 2005 TDCJ report
stating that applicant wrote a suicide note,
although the report indicated that applicant
denied having written it. Compton testified
that applicant’s affect was flat during her 45
evaluation and he seemed a little depressed.
Although he denied being currently
depressed, applicant admitted that he had
experienced some depression in the past. And
while applicant was not formally diagnosed
with depression during his schooling, school
officials twice recognized that he was
experiencing emotional disturbances.

Compton testified that applicant’s 78 IQ
score on the WISC was the most reliable IQ
score reflected in his records because it was
the first and only full scale, individually
administered IQ test given during the
developmental period. Compton stated that,
because she could not tell whether applicant
took the original WISC or the WISC-R, she
made alternative Flynn Effect adjustments to
his reported score: 69 to 70 IQ, assuming that
applicant took the original WISC, and 73 to
74 IQ, assuming that he took the WISC-R.

Compton did not consider applicant’s 59 IQ
score on the WAIS-IV that she administered
to be valid due to persistent indicators
throughout her assessment that applicant was
exerting
suboptimal
effort.
After
interviewing him about his personal history,
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Compton gave applicant the Test of Memory
Malingering (TOMM), an effort test.
Compton testified that applicant’s results
suggested that he was not exerting full effort,
even when she gave him the benefit of the
doubt by assuming that he was intellectually
disabled and applying only the specific
norms for intellectually disabled individuals.
When Compton subsequently administered
the WAIS-IV, applicant obtained a full scale
IQ score that was significantly lower than she
had expected. Further, Compton stated, her
analysis of applicant’s WAIS-IV results
revealed pervasive internal discrepancies that
indicated suboptimal performance.
Compton testified that her analysis of
applicant’s WAIS-IV results also revealed a
significant discrepancy between the
crystallized knowledge that applicant had
demonstrated in 1989 intelligence testing and
what he currently professed to know. When
Compton asked applicant what a
thermometer was, he told her that he did not
know, although he had answered the same
question correctly when an examiner had
asked it in 1989. Compton stated that it was
rare to simply forget the meaning of a
previously known word and noted that both
her own and Dr. Anderson’s testing had
placed applicant’s memory in the lowaverage
range. When Compton checked the validity
of her WAIS-IV testing with additional effort
testing, the results (lower than expected
scores and indications of suboptimal effort)
were very similar to applicant’s WAIS-IV
results.
The record does not support considering
applicant’s IQ scores on the OLMAT,
Slosson, 1984 abbreviated WAIS-R, 2013
RCPM, or derived IQ scores on the Bender
Gestalt and Goodenough tests given in 1973,
because of the evidence that these
instruments were

noncomprehensive screening or group IQ
tests, neuropsychological tests rather than IQ
tests, or derived IQ scores using the ratio
method and concept of mental age rather than
the degree of statistical deviation from the
mean. The record additionally does not 49
support considering applicant’s IQ score on
the WAIS-IV, given the compelling evidence
of his suboptimal effort on that instrument.
We are left with applicant’s 78 IQ score on
the WISC at age 13 in 1973 and his 74 IQ
score on the WAIS-R at age 30 in 1989.
Taking into account the standard error of
measurement, applicant’s score range on the
WISC is between 73 and 83. The fact that
applicant took a now-outmoded version of
the WISC in 1973 might tend to place his
actual IQ score in a somewhat lower portion
of that 73 to 83 range. However, the evidence
that applicant was traumatized by paternal
violence, was referred for testing due to
withdrawn behavior, came from an
impoverished
and
minority
cultural
background, and started to abuse drugs by the
time of testing might tend to place his actual
IQ in a somewhat higher portion of that 73–
83 range. “Taken altogether, there is no
reason to think that applicant’s obtained IQ
score” of 78 on the WISC “is inaccurate or
does not fairly represent his borderline
intelligence during the developmental stage.”
The score that applicant obtained on the 1989
WAIS-R supports the conclusion that his
WISC score accurately and fairly represented
his intellectual functioning during the
developmental period. Applicant’s score
range on the WAIS-R is between 69 and 79.
As with the WISC, the fact that applicant
took a now-outmoded version of the WAISR might tend to place his actual IQ score in a
somewhat lower portion of that 69 to 79
range. However, by the time he took the
WAIS-R, applicant had a history of academic
failure, something that his own expert stated
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could adversely affect effort. Applicant also
took
the
WAIS-R
under
adverse
circumstances; he was on death row and
facing the prospect of execution, and he had
exhibited withdrawn and depressive
behavior. These considerations might tend to
place his actual IQ in a somewhat higher
portion of that 69 to 79 range. Considering
these factors together, we find no reason to
doubt that applicant’s WAIS-R score
accurately and fairly represented his
intellectual functioning as being above the
intellectually disabled range.

deficits in adaptive behavior. On crossexamination and redirect, Borda 51
acknowledged that standardized measures of
adaptive functioning exist, that many
adolescents with poor adaptive skills—for
example, homeless teenagers—are not
intellectually disabled, and that just because
someone lacks certain skills does not mean
that the person is intellectually disabled.
Borda also acknowledged that applicant had
adaptive skills during the developmental
period, but opined that they were probably
below average for someone of his age.

B. Significant, Related Deficits in Adaptive
Behavior

The State asked Borda whether evidence that
applicant mowed grass for money and
hustled pool suggested that he had money
skills, knowledge that he needed to earn
money, and the self-direction to obtain a job
to make it. Borda suggested that he did not
have sufficient information to render an
opinion because he did not know whether
applicant had independently thought of these
ways to make money. Borda initially
suggested that the offense facts did not
indicate that applicant possessed adaptive
skills, due to Borda’s impression that others
dragged applicant into it, that applicant went
along because he was afraid to say no, and
that no particular planning went into the
offense. Borda stated that intellectually
disabled people are suggestible and, if told to
do something, they will do it. But Borda
acknowledged that he did not know much
about the offense and had not read applicant’s
confession or trial testimony.

Even if applicant had proven that he suffers
from significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning, his Atkins claim fails
because he has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has
significant and related limitations in adaptive
functioning.
At the 2014 evidentiary hearing, Borda
defined adaptive functioning as the ability to
successfully do everyday things on one’s
own. But Borda also asserted that adaptive
functioning describes a concept that is more
complicated than being able to perform a
certain specific task, such as balancing a
checkbook. He characterized adaptive
functioning as neuropsychological or
executive frontal-lobe functioning, such as
the ability to make a decision, implement the
decision, assess whether one is getting to a
correct solution, and if not, to modify his
behavior.
On direct examination, Borda agreed with
habeas counsel’s statement that applicant’s
family history indicated that applicant had
“strong” problems adapting, as to social
behaviors and the academic realm. But Borda
gave no more specific testimony about

Greenspan testified that, for purposes of
diagnosing intellectual disability, “adaptive
functioning” concerns how one functions in
the world. He stated that adaptive functioning
is not the same as executive functioning,
which is a cognitive measure that looks at
certain underlying reasoning skills. On direct
examination, Greenspan asserted that he saw
no evidence of applicant’s competence in any
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of the adaptive behavior areas. On
crossexamination, Greenspan acknowledged
that applicant had areas “of greater ability,”
but asserted that they did not exclude an
intellectual-disability diagnosis. Although
Greenspan stated that he was generally
familiar with the facts of applicant’s offense,
he acknowledged that he had not read the
transcript of either of applicant’s two trials.

knowing, and intelligent; (6) writing four
letters to his appellate lawyer that escalated
from, “When are you going to file my
appeal?,” to “I object to you getting any
extensions” to “Why won’t you respond to
any of my letters?” to “I object to you being
my lawyer from this point forward”; (6)
hustling pool; and (7) working as a barber and
a porter in prison.

Greenspan testified that the Texas
Independent Living Scale (TILS) given to
applicant by Dr. Compton is a standardized
test that is generally accepted within the
psychological community and considered a
direct measure of adaptive behavior. He
emphasized that applicant scored two-and-ahalf standard deviations below the mean on
the TILS.

Anderson testified that she conducted a group
interview of applicant’s relatives to
determine whether applicant had any
longstanding, chronic deficits. From
applicant’s relatives, Anderson learned that
he had unspecified deficits that were seen
early and reported by his school. Applicant’s
relatives also told Anderson that he was never
left alone, someone had to “hold his hand,”
and he needed help with his homework.

Greenspan minimized the evidence that
applicant had learned to survive on the street
and in prison. Despite his earlier definition of
adaptive behavior, Greenspan asserted that
applicant’s ability to function in prison and
street environments did not necessarily
reflect “adaptive” behavior, as that term is
understood by the psychological community.
Greenspan did not think that any of
applicant’s performance on the following
activities evidenced adaptive skills: (1) in
preparation for his new punishment trial,
consulting with counsel about whether to
inform the jury that he had been on death
row; (2) concealing a shotgun in a shopping
bag when entering a store to rob it; (3)
attempting to conceal his appearance during
the offense by wearing a wig and sunglasses,
and after the offense, changing his
appearance by shaving his head; (4) arguing
with accomplices over how to divide the
proceeds of the crime; (5) deciding to
stipulate that he had prior criminal
convictions and responding appropriately to
questioning by the court to determine
whether the stipulation was voluntary,

Anderson acknowledged that, if a person
donned a wig before entering a business to
commit robbery, it indicated some
forethought and planning, but she could not
say whether the behavior showed an ability to
protect one’s self-interest. Anderson had no
opinion on whether walking into the business
with a shotgun concealed in shopping bags
demonstrated an ability to plan ahead and
protect one’s self-interest. Anderson testified
that committing a crime and then fleeing to
another city did not necessarily demonstrate
the ability to form and execute a plan for selfpreservation. Anderson denied seeing
evidence that applicant had excelled in any
way since being imprisoned.
Compton stated that adaptive functioning
examines everyday social, practical, and
conceptual skills. She testified that she gave
applicant a TILS test and acknowledged that
applicant’s TILS score fell two-and-a-half
standard deviations below the mean. But
Compton explained that the TILS score was
not an accurate representation of applicant’s
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abilities because she had to assign zeroes to
questions asking about areas to which
applicant had no exposure, such as writing a
check and using a microwave oven.
When Compton gave applicant a complete
WRAT-4, a test of academic abilities, his
results fell within the second-grade level for
mathematical skills and the third-grade level
for reading comprehension and writing skills.
Compton noted that applicant’s writing
ability scores on the WRAT-4 were
inconsistent with the seventh-grade level
ability he had demonstrated in letters he had
written to friends. Compton testified that
applicant’s performance on the WRAT-4
math subtest was also internally inconsistent.
Although applicant was able to perform
advanced math at certain times, at other
times, he missed very simple questions.
Applicant’s performance on the WRAT-4
math subtest was also inconsistent with
abilities he had demonstrated elsewhere,
including in his commissary records.
Compton testified that these inconsistencies
increased the probability that applicant was
not exerting full effort on the WRAT-4 math
subtest.
Compton testified that she found some
limitations in applicant’s academic skills and
some adaptive deficits in social interaction
during the developmental period, but she also
saw evidence of adaptive skills. For example,
she saw evidence that applicant had lived in
the back of a pool hall, as well as evidence
that he had played pool and mowed lawns for
money. Compton said that living on the
streets in itself required applicant to engage
in adaptive behavior. She opined that playing
pool and mowing lawns showed some ability
to understand money and work concepts.
Compton also saw evidence that applicant
possessed adaptive skills at the time of the
offense and original trial. Applicant’s

behavior surrounding the crime (wearing a
wig, covering up the gun, and fleeing to
Louisiana)
all
indicated
planning,
forethought, and an appreciation of the need
to do something to avoid apprehension,
which also related to his ability to engage in
abstract thinking.
Compton added that applicant’s 1980 trial
testimony indicated that he had some ability
to engage in abstract reasoning because he
was able to conceptualize what his counsel
and the State were asking and to form
appropriate and exculpatory answers.
Compton noted that applicant withstood both
direct and cross examination and he testified
in a coherent fashion. Compton stated that
testifying and undergoing cross examination
is a stressful experience for most people.
Applicant’s 1980 trial testimony also showed
that he was able to process and respond to
questions without significant difficulty even
under stressful conditions. Applicant’s
testimony
showed
that
he
could
conceptualize the process and form
exculpatory responses and alternative
explanations, which further indicated an
ability to process and manipulate information
and
form
a
response.
Compton
acknowledged that defense counsel may have
prepared applicant for his 1980 trial
testimony, but she noted that applicant had
not had a lawyer to coach him for his 1983
Faretta hearing, at which he represented
himself. Applicant had been able to
understand what the trial court was asking
him at the Faretta hearing and had responded
appropriately, although he had difficulty with
some of the legal issues.
Compton also saw evidence that applicant
had developed adaptive skills in prison. In
addition to representing himself at the 1983
Faretta hearing, applicant had learned to read
and write in prison. His personal, handwritten
correspondence demonstrated a seventh162

grade writing ability. Compton indicated that
applicant’s writing ability could exceed a
seventh-grade level if he also wrote the
various handwritten and typewritten pro se
motions presented at the evidentiary hearing.
Regarding the handwritten pro se motions,
Compton observed that the handwriting was
very similar to the handwriting that she had
seen throughout her review of applicant’s
case. Regarding the typewritten documents,
Compton testified that applicant told her that
he did not know how to type and that she had
been told that he did not own a typewriter.
Compton also acknowledged that inmates
share pleadings and that Fronciewiz had
testified that inmate David Harris had worked
for applicant at one time. But Compton
testified that simply being involved in the
process by copying the motions by hand
would indicate understanding and require the
ability to write. Compton opined that copying
a legal motion would be something within the
realm of only a few intellectually disabled
people.
Compton found additional evidence of
adaptive skills in applicant’s TDCJ records.
She testified that a disciplinary report stated
that another inmate had been in applicant’s
cell to play dominoes. Compton opined that
this indicated that applicant possessed social
interaction skills and the ability to count
because the game of dominoes required that
skill.
Compton noted that applicant’s TDCJ
classification file included a letter and
questionnaire from TDCJ to the manager of
Two-K restaurant, where applicant had
previously worked. Compton agreed that the
manager’s responses showed that applicant
could function in the capacity for which he
had been hired. Regarding disciplinary
problems, the manager had written that
applicant was “capable of influencing others
to dissent [and] like[d] confrontation.”
Compton testified that the comment

evidenced applicant’s
leadership skills.

conceptual

and

Compton
agreed
that
applicant’s
classification file also included a Social
Summary, dated December 1, 1983, in which
applicant had cited the advice of counsel and
declined to discuss his offense. Compton
stated that the fact that applicant declined
questioning on the advice of counsel showed
that he had the ability to understand
instruction, conceptualize it, and act on it.
Compton testified that incidents documented
in applicant’s death-row disciplinary records
demonstrated his ability to form the intent to
influence other people and to act on it, which
fell within the social-skills domain, and the
ability to stand up to authority, which was
inconsistent
with
suggestibility
and
gullibility.
Compton also found evidence of adaptive
skills in items that had recently been found in
applicant’s cell. Compton stated that a packet
of handwritten letters, which were all in the
same handwriting, had a seventh-grade-level
readability score. She testified that a
composition notebook found in applicant’s
cell contained the same handwriting
throughout
it.
Although
Compton
acknowledged that applicant might have
copied some of the notebook’s contents from
other sources, she indicated that other parts
might have been the product of applicant’s
independent thought. The composition book
contained a handwritten table matching the
Wechsler Scales’s normal distribution of IQ
scores, which suggested to Compton that
applicant was investigating IQ scores from
his prison cell.
Compton agreed that books, a newspaper,
and newspaper articles were found in
applicant’s cell. Each of the books, which
included copies of the Qur’an and Know
Your Islam, had applicant’s name, inmate
identification number, and a date written
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inside the cover. One of the articles
concerned winning an appeal. Many of the
books and newspaper articles found in
applicant’s cell contained underlining.
Compton testified that an underlined passage
could indicate that a person is reading and
comprehending the underlined text. Although
Compton acknowledged that people
sometimes also underline passages that they
do not fully understand, she testified that the
action of underlining indicates the person’s
desire to return to the passage and review it,
and thus still involves processing and
conceptualization. Compton also stated that
even if a person underlines passages because
he does not understand them, the act implies
that he has understood the surrounding text.
Other items found in applicant’s cell included
heavily notated calendars for the years 2012
through 2014. Compton testified that
notations on the calendars indicated that
applicant understood the concept of months,
an understanding that he also demonstrated in
Compton’s testing. She agreed that the
calendars had sections for people’s names,
addresses, and telephone numbers, all of
which were appropriately completed.
Compton also found it significant that
applicant’s expert witnesses at the 2001
punishment retrial (i.e., Halpin and Wright)
determined that applicant’s adaptive abilities
had progressed since his imprisonment and
that his progress indicated that he had a
strong ability to learn. Compton noted that
another witness at the 2001 retrial, Jo Ann
Cross, had echoed Halpin’s and Wright’s
testimony regarding applicant’s ability to
learn.
We find Compton’s opinion far more
credible and reliable than those of applicant’s
experts who testified at the 2014 evidentiary
hearing. The record shows that Compton is a
forensic psychologist with considerable

experience
in
conducting
forensic
evaluations. Her testimony shows that she
thoroughly and rigorously reviewed a great
deal of material concerning applicant’s
intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior. In addition, she personally
evaluated applicant. During that evaluation,
Compton administered comprehensive IQ
testing via the WAIS-IV, a gold-standard
test; various forms of effort testing to assess
the validity of her IQ testing; and the TILS, a
standardized
measure
of
adaptive
functioning. Compton testified in detail about
why, even applying the most lenient
standards, the results of her effort testing
suggested that applicant had exerted
suboptimal effort on the WAIS-IV. Compton
also gave persuasive and unrebutted
testimony explaining why applicant’s score
on the TILS under-represented his adaptive
skills. She further detailed numerous
examples in applicant’s records that
demonstrated his adaptive skills.
In contrast, Borda, Greenspan, and Anderson
were clinical psychologists or clinical neuropsychologists whose credibility suffered
from their review of relatively limited
material. Greenspan did not personally assess
applicant, and his testimony suggested that
his direct experience with IQ testing was
fairly limited and remote in time.
Although he personally examined applicant,
Borda conceded that the assessment was
extremely brief and did not include
comprehensive, full-scale IQ testing with a
gold-standard instrument or effort testing.
Borda and Greenspan also premised many of
their conclusions on the concept of mental
age and used the unreliable ratio method to
calculate IQ scores from instruments that
were not designed for such purposes.
Although Anderson personally examined
applicant, she did so for a purpose other than
evaluating him for intellectual disability.
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Further, Anderson did not administer any test
for the purpose of obtaining an IQ score and,
from her testimony, she appeared to have
completed relatively few intellectual
disability assessments.
Further, each of applicant’s experts who
testified at the evidentiary hearing appear to
have applied a more demanding standard to
the issue of adaptive behavior than we have
contemplated for Eighth Amendment
purposes.
Although Borda testified that adaptive
functioning is the ability to successfully do
everyday things on one’s own, he also
characterized it as executive functioning.
Greenspan defined adaptive behavior as how
one functions in the world and expressly
acknowledged that adaptive behavior and
executive functioning are distinct concepts.
However, Greenspan’s application of the
definition to the evidence—for example, his
minimization of the evidence that applicant
had learned to survive on the street and in
prison—suggest that he was actually
applying a more stringent standard.
Alternatively, it suggests that Greenspan’s
opinions were not reasonable. Anderson was
not asked to define adaptive functioning, but
in her testimony, she often equated adaptive
functioning with executive functioning.
Compton’s opinion finds further support in
applicant’s school records, which were
accurately summarized at the 2001
punishment retrial by applicant’s expert
witness. Those records reflect applicant’s
poor academic grades (especially in areas
involving language), uneven conduct grades,
retention in first grade, below-grade-level
scores on academic-achievement tests, and
references to instances of withdrawn
behavior. In kindergarten, a physician
considered the possibility that applicant’s
withdrawn behavior was due to intellectual

disability, although the physician indicated
that emotional problems were the more likely
cause. Subsequent IQ testing on a goldstandard instrument yielded a score that was
not in the intellectually disabled range—even
considering the extreme low end of the
scoring range—and applicant remained in
regular classrooms throughout his time in
school.
Although Compton found that applicant
manifested some limitations in academic and
social-interaction
skills
during
the
developmental period, she testified that his
level of adaptive functioning had been too
great, even before he went to prison, to
support an intellectual-disability diagnosis.
But even assuming for purposes of argument
that applicant’s limitations in academic and
social-interaction skills were significant, the
record does not support a finding that these
deficits were linked to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.
Rather, the record overwhelmingly supports
the conclusion that applicant’s academic
difficulties were caused by a variety of
factors, including trauma from the
emotionally
and
physically
abusive
atmosphere in which he was raised,
undiagnosed learning disorders, changing
elementary schools three times in three years,
racially motivated harassment and violence at
school, a history of academic failure, drug
abuse, and absenteeism. The same is true of
any social difficulty that applicant
experienced during the developmental
period.
The significant advances applicant has
demonstrated while confined on death row
further support the conclusion that his
academic and social difficulties were not
related to significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning. In addition, our
consideration of the Briseno evidentiary
factors weighs heavily against a finding that
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applicant’s adaptive deficits, of whatever
nature and degree they may be, are related to
significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning.
The first Briseno factor considers whether
those who knew applicant best during the
developmental stage considered him to be
intellectually disabled and acted in
accordance with that determination. The
evidence does not weigh in applicant’s favor.
Although the physician who examined
applicant before kindergarten considered
intellectual disability as a possible cause for
applicant’s withdrawn behavior, the
physician contemporaneously stated that
emotional problems were the more likely
cause. Applicant’s records do not reflect any
intellectual-disability diagnosis, and they do
show that he remained in normal classrooms
during his school career.
At the evidentiary hearing, habeas counsel
attempted to show that applicant’s father
singled applicant out for abuse and threw
applicant out of the house because he
perceived applicant as being intellectually
disabled or “slow.” However, the record is
replete with evidence that Junior physically
and emotionally abused all of his children, as
well as with evidence that Junior also drove
some of applicant’s siblings from the family
home. Although there is evidence that
applicant’s inability to spell on command
may have angered Junior, there is abundant
evidence from multiple sources that applicant
was the target of Junior’s ire because he
intervened in his parents’ altercations, tried to
protect his mother and other siblings from
Junior, and often caught Junior in infidelity.
The record also indicates that applicant was
left in charge of his younger siblings. And
applicant’s sister, Colleen McNeese, testified
at the 2014 evidentiary hearing that she had

not considered applicant to be intellectually
disabled.
Regarding the second Briseno factor, the
evidence shows that applicant formulated
plans and carried them through. The various
affidavits, testimony, and interviews that
applicant’s relatives have given indicate that,
when he and his siblings were hungry,
applicant took it upon himself to earn money
from the neighbors and then used the money
to buy food. During his 1980 trial, applicant
insisted on presenting an alibi defense, and
his testimony was consistent with that
defense. He doggedly pursued his desire to
obtain new appellate counsel after his 1980
trial by writing to various courts, attorneys,
and organizations, filing pleadings and
motions, and marshaling exhibits to present
at the 1983 Faretta hearing. The previously
mentioned conduct and incidents in
applicant’s prison disciplinary records also
indicate leadership, the third Briseno factor.
The fourth and fifth Briseno factors address
whether applicant responds rationally and
appropriately to external stimuli and whether
he responds coherently, rationally, and on
point to oral or written questions. The many
instances of applicant’s testimony and
interactions with courts over the course of
this case, as well as the testimony of
witnesses at his 2001 punishment retrial,
indicate that the answers to these questions
are yes.
The varying statements that applicant gave to
police about the offense and his 1980 and
1993 testimony indicate that he can hide facts
or lie effectively in his own interest, the sixth
Briseno factor. The facts of the offense
further indicate that it required forethought,
planning, and moderately complex execution
of purpose, the final Briseno factor.
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C. Onset During the Developmental Period
Given applicant’s failure to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he suffers
from significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning and that any
significant deficits in adaptive behavior are
related to significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning, he has not
established that he was intellectually disabled
before the age of eighteen.
In sum, we conclude that for Eighth
Amendment purposes, applicant is a person
capable of functioning adequately in his
everyday
world
with
intellectual
understanding and moral appreciation of his
behavior. We therefore reject applicant’s
contention that he is exempt from execution
under Atkins.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we deny
relief on applicant’s first claim after
assuming our role as the ultimate fact-finder
in this case regarding applicant’s assertion
that he is entitled to relief under Atkins.
The habeas court did not enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding applicant’s
second and third claims for relief. In his

second claim, applicant contends that he was
denied due process because Texas’s deathpenalty statute does not contemplate
intellectual disability as a bar to the execution
of an intellectually disabled individual. In his
third claim, applicant contends that his death
sentence violated the Sixth Amendment
under
Atkins and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002), because the jury’s verdict did not
include a determination of an essential
element of capital murder—that he is not
intellectually disabled. Applicant’s briefing
concerning his second claim is inadequate
because he fails to plead and prove facts
which would entitle him to relief.
The Court has previously rejected the Ring
argument that applicant raises in his third
claim. Applicant’s second and third claims
for relief are denied.
As to applicant’s remaining claims (Claims
4–48), we find that the record supports the
habeas court’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and recommendation. We accordingly
adopt “Respondent’s Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order”
regarding Claims 4–48, and deny relief on all
of applicant’s claims.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 6, 2016

The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear two appeals raising questions about the
roles race and intellectual disability might
play in capital prosecutions.
One case, Buck v. Stephens, No. 15-8049,
arose from a psychologist’s testimony that
black defendants were more dangerous than
white ones.
The case concerns Duane Buck, who was
convicted of the 1995 murders of a former
girlfriend and one of her friends while her
young children watched. Texas law allows
death sentences only if prosecutors can show
the defendant poses a future danger to
society.
During the trial’s sentencing phase, Mr.
Buck’s lawyer presented testimony from the
psychologist, Walter Quijano, who said that
race was one of the factors associated with
future dangerousness. “It’s a sad commentary
that minorities, Hispanics and black people,
are overrepresented in the criminal justice
system,” Dr. Quijano testified.
A prosecutor followed up. “The race factor,
black, increases the future dangerousness for
various complicated reasons — is that
correct?”
Dr. Quijano answered, “Yes.”

One of Mr. Buck’s trial lawyers, Jerry
Guerinot, has a dismal record in death
penalty cases, having represented 20 people
sentenced to death in Texas, more than are
awaiting execution in about half of the states
that have the death penalty.
In their petition seeking Supreme Court
review, Mr. Buck’s new lawyers said that his
trial lawyers had been ineffective and that
Mr. Buck’s death sentence was infected by
racial bias.
“Left uncorrected, trial counsel’s injection of
explicit racial discrimination into Mr. Buck’s
capital sentencing profoundly undermines
confidence in the integrity of both Mr.
Buck’s death sentence and the criminal
justice system over all,” Mr. Buck’s lawyers
told the justices.
The cases will be argued during the court’s
next term, which starts in October.
In turning down an earlier appeal from Mr.
Buck in 2011 based on assertions of
prosecutorial misconduct, five justices
expressed misgivings about what had
happened at his trial.
Calling Dr. Quijano’s testimony “bizarre and
objectionable,” Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and
Stephen G. Breyer, indicated that there were
168

serious questions about the conduct of Mr.
Buck’s own lawyers.
“Dr. Quijano’s testimony would provide a
basis for reversal of petitioner’s sentence if
the prosecution were responsible for
presenting that testimony to the jury,” Justice
Alito wrote. “But Dr. Quijano was a defense
witness, and it was petitioner’s attorney, not
the prosecutor, who first elicited Dr.
Quijano’s view regarding the correlation
between race and future dangerousness.”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice
Elena Kagan, said she would have voted to
hear the case even as a challenge to
prosecutorial misconduct. She noted that in
2000 the state’s attorney general, John
Cornyn, had seemed to promise to allow new
sentencings for several inmates, including
Mr. Buck, who had been sent to death row
based in part on Dr. Quijano’s testimony.
Texas prosecutors now say Mr. Buck’s
appeal is barred on procedural grounds.
The justices also agreed on Monday to hear
an appeal from Bobby J. Moore, who has
been on death row since 1980 for fatally
shooting a 72-year-old Houston supermarket
clerk, James McCarble, during a robbery.
That case, Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, raises
questions about whether Texas uses outdated
standards in assessing whether a defendant’s
intellectual disability was severe enough to
bar his execution.
When the court ruled in 2002 in Atkins v.
Virginia that the Constitution forbade the
execution of people with mental disabilities,
it gave states only general guidance. It said a
finding of intellectual disability required
proof of three things: “subaverage

intellectual functioning,” meaning low I.Q.
scores; a lack of fundamental social and
practical skills; and the presence of both
conditions before age 18. The court said I.Q.
scores under “approximately 70” typically
indicated disability.
In 2014, in Hall v. Florida, though, the court
ruled that Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff was too
rigid to decide which mentally disabled
individuals must be spared the death penalty.
“Florida seeks to execute a man because he
scored a 71 instead of 70 on an I.Q. test,”
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the
majority in a 5-to-4 decision.
In Mr. Moore’s case, a trial court found that
he was intellectually disabled and
constitutionally ineligible for the death
penalty. An appeals court reversed that
decision, saying the lower court had erred by
“employing the definition of intellectual
disability presently used.”
The appeals court ruled that a 23-year-old
standard applied instead and that, under it,
Mr. Moore was not intellectually disabled.
When the Supreme Court announced on
Monday morning that it would hear Mr.
Moore’s case, it said the justices would also
consider a second question: whether
executing a condemned inmate more than 35
years after he was sentenced to death violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
Some two hours later, the court issued a
revised order, limiting its review to the
intellectual-disability issue.
Two members of the court, Justices Kennedy
and Breyer, have invited challenges to
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prolonged solitary confinement. “Years on
end of near total isolation exact a terrible
price,” Justice Kennedy wrote, for instance,
in a concurrence last year, adding that “the
condition in which prisoners are kept simply
has not been a matter of sufficient public
inquiry or interest.”

The court also agreed to hear an appeal in a
gerrymandering challenge to Virginia’s
legislative map, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia
Board of Elections, No. 15-680. That case
will also be argued in the next term.

The two justices will now have to await
another case.
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“Supreme Court Makes Slip-Up In Death Penalty Case”
The Huffington Post
Cristian Farias
June 7, 2016

Evincing that things may be in a bit of
disarray since the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia, the Supreme Court on Monday made
a misstep when agreeing to hear the case of a
prisoner seeking to challenge his death
sentence.

respect to the death penalty or its application
to specific defendants.
As part of their usual Monday business, the
justices issued an order at 9:30 a.m. noting
that they would agree to hear the two
questions raised by Moore’s petition:

The case was one of two death penalty
appeals the court added to its docket for its
next term, which begins in October.
The Texas inmate, Bobby Moore, had
actually asked the court to review two
constitutional issues relating to his capital
sentence:

Supreme Court of the United States

That was a big deal, because the second
question of Moore’s petition — whether
sitting on death row for 35 years amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment — touches on
one of the practices Justice Stephen Breyer
has repeatedly singled out as problematic in
America’s system of capital punishment.
That development was short-lived.
At around 11:44 a.m., a court spokeswoman
alerted the press that the court had made a
mistake and that now only the first question
in Moore’s petition was accepted for review.

Supreme Court of the United States
A Texas death row inmate who wanted his case heard by the
Supreme Court raised two important questions.

Both are significant questions, implicating
recent decisions and statements by the
Supreme Court or individual justices with

The court accordingly amended the order and
republished it on its website:

Supreme Court of the United States
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That means Moore — who was convicted and
sentenced to death in 1980 and has been
awaiting punishment since — will not get an
answer to whether the length of his
confinement, much of which is in complete
isolation, violates the Constitution.
The remaining question in his case is still
important: The Supreme Court will now
decide whether states may rely on outdated
medical standards when determining whether
a person who is intellectually disabled merits
the death penalty.
The Supreme Court has already ruled that it’s
unconstitutional to sentence to death
someone who is intellectually disabled, and
that states may not use rigid “cutoff” tests
when assessing a person’s mental disability.
States, however, are far from consistent in the
assessments they use.

For Moore, this is a matter of life and death:
Relying on experts, a court had determined
that he bore all the hallmarks of someone who
was intellectually disabled – including an IQ
of 70, deplorable school performance, and
“sub-normal intellectual functioning.” But
Texas has resisted these findings and has
insisted that Moore be assessed using older
medical standards for intellectual disability.
Here’s hoping the court’s final decision in the
case will bring some clarity to that area of the
law, if not to those who were a little confused
by its actions on Monday.
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“Houston Man on Death Row 35 Years Loses Appeal”
NBC Local Affiliate- Dallas-Ft. Worth
September 16, 2015

The state's highest criminal court has upheld
the death sentence of one of Texas' longestserving death row inmates.

McCarble, was fatally shot during a robbery.
Only six of the state's some 250 condemned
inmates have been on death row longer.

A divided Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
on Wednesday rejected arguments that 55year-old Bobby James Moore is mentally
impaired and ineligible for execution.

Moore received a new punishment hearing in
2001 after a federal court threw out his
original death sentence.

Two of the eight judges involved in the ruling
disagreed with the majority.

In 1986, the Houston man came within 10
hours of execution before he received a
federal court reprieve.

Moore has been on death row since July
1980, three months after a 72-year-old
Houston
supermarket
clerk,
James

173

“Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 6, 2016

In 2002, the Supreme Court barred the
execution of the intellectually disabled. But it
gave states a lot of leeway to decide just who
was, in the language of the day, “mentally
retarded.”
Texas took a creative approach, adopting
what one judge there later called “the Lennie
standard.” That sounds like a reference to an
august precedent, but it is not. The Lennie in
question is Lennie Small, the dim, hulking
farmhand in John Steinbeck’s “Of Mice and
Men.”
The Lennie in question is fictional.
Still, Judge Cathy Cochran of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in 2004 that
Lennie should be a legal touchstone.
“Most Texas citizens might agree that
Steinbeck’s Lennie should, by virtue of his
lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills,
be exempt” from the death penalty, she
wrote. “But, does a consensus of Texas
citizens agree that all persons who might
legitimately qualify for assistance under the
social services definition of mental
retardation be exempt from an otherwise
constitutional penalty?”
Judge Cochran, who later said she had reread
“all of Steinbeck” in the 1960s while living
above Cannery Row in Monterey, Calif.,

listed seven factors that could spare someone
like Lennie, whose rash killing of a young
woman was seemingly accidental.
For instance: “Has the person formulated
plans and carried them through, or is his
conduct impulsive?”
And: “Can the person hide facts or lie
effectively?”
This fall, in Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, the
United States Supreme Court will consider
whether the Court of Criminal Appeals,
Texas’ highest court for criminal matters,
went astray last year in upholding the death
sentence of Bobby J. Moore based in part on
outdated medical criteria and in part on the
Lennie standard.
Mr. Moore killed James McCarble, a 70year-old grocery clerk, during a robbery in
1980 in Houston.
No one disputes that Mr. Moore is at least
mentally challenged or, as a psychologist
testifying for the prosecution put it at a 2014
hearing, that he most likely “suffers from
borderline intellectual functioning.”
Mr. Moore reached his teenage years without
understanding how to tell time, the days of
the week or the relationship between
subtraction and addition. His I.Q. has been
measured as high as 78 and as low as 57,
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averaging around 70. On the other hand, the
psychologist testified, the young Bobby
Moore had shown skill at mowing lawns and
playing pool.
The state judge who heard this evidence,
relying on current medical standards on
intellectual disability, concluded that
executing Mr. Moore would violate the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
But the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
the ruling, saying the judge had made a
mistake in “employing the definition of
intellectual disability presently used.”
Under medical standards from 1992,
endorsed in Judge Cochran’s 2004 opinion,
Mr. Moore was not intellectually disabled,
the appeals court said. The court added that
the seven factors listed in the 2004 opinion
weighed heavily against Mr. Moore. He had,
for instance, worn a wig during the robbery
and tried to hide his shotgun in two plastic
bags, which prosecutors said was evidence of
forethought and planning.
In dissent, Judge Elsa Alcala said the 1992
medical standards used by the majority were
“outdated and erroneous.” As for the seven
factors, she wrote, “The Lennie standard does
not meet the requirements of the federal
Constitution.”
“I would set forth a standard,” Judge Alcala
wrote, “that does not include any reference to
a fictional character.”
In a brief, Ken Paxton, the state’s attorney
general, defended the seven factors, though
without mentioning Lennie. He also urged
the Supreme Court to let judges and juries,

rather than medical professionals, decide
who should be spared the death penalty.
That echoed a 2014 dissent from Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr., who said it was a bad
idea to rely on the shifting views of medical
experts to decide who must be spared
execution based on intellectual disability.
The majority in that case, Hall v. Florida,
struck down Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff of 70
as too rigid.
In doing so, Justice Alito wrote, the majority
had effectively overruled the part of its 2002
Atkins v. Virginia decision that allowed
states to use their own definitions of
intellectual disability, and instead imposed
“the evolving standards of professional
societies, most notably the American
Psychiatric Association.”
An article last year in the Yale Law Journal
presented an intriguing alternative to the
evolving standards that bothered Justice
Alito. Drawing on historical materials,
Michael Clemente, then a law student at Yale
and now a law clerk for a federal judge,
demonstrated that the original understanding
of the Eighth Amendment, based on English
common law, barred the execution of people
whose mental abilities were below those of
an ordinary child of 14.
Such a standard, steeped in originalism, a
mode of constitutional interpretation
embraced by Justice Clarence Thomas and
the late Justice Antonin Scalia, would seem
to spare both Mr. Moore and Lennie. On the
other hand, it is not clear that Lennie himself
would have escaped execution under Texas’
Lennie standard. He did, for instance, try to
conceal his crime, hiding his victim’s body.
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In a 1937 interview with The New York
Times, John Steinbeck said he had based
Lennie on a man who had killed a ranch
foreman but was shown leniency. “Lennie
was a real person,” Mr. Steinbeck said. “He’s
in an insane asylum in California right now.”
Seventy-five years later, Mr. Steinbeck’s son
Thomas heard about Texas’ Lennie standard.
“The character of Lennie was never intended
to be used to diagnose a medical condition
like intellectual disability,” Thomas
Steinbeck, who died this month, said in a

2012 statement. “I find the whole premise to
be insulting, outrageous, ridiculous and
profoundly tragic.”
“I am certain that if my father, John
Steinbeck, were here, he would be deeply
angry and ashamed to see his work used in
this way,” he said. “And the last thing you
ever wanted to do was to make John
Steinbeck angry.”
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Manuel v. City of Joliet
15-9496
Ruling Below: Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App'x 641 (7th Cir. 2015)
Manuel was subject of a traffic stop on March 18, 2011. The officer claimed to detect the odor of
cannabis, and proceeded to drag Manuel out of the vehicle and cuff him. The officer found a
bottle of pills on Manuel during a pat down. The pills were then tested by officers who had
arrived at the scene. These officers falsified results to show the pills as ecstasy. Later tests
showed this to be false. Manuel was then held for more than a month before the charges were
dropped, resulting in personal and professional costs.
Manuel filed suit on grounds of malicious prosecution, but the claims were dismissed. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as to allow a malicious prosecution
claim based upon the Fourth Amendment.

Elijah MANUEL, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
CITY OF JOLIET, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Decided on January 28, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division. No. 13 C 3022, Milton I. Shadur,
Judge.
Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge,
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit
Judge, JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit
Judge.
ORDER

Elijah Manuel appeals the dismissal of his
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that the City of Joliet and several of its police
officers maliciously prosecuted him when
they falsified the results of drug tests and then
arrested him for possession with intent to
distribute ecstasy. The district court
dismissed his claim as foreclosed by
Newsome v. McCabe, because Illinois law
already provided an adequate remedy for
malicious prosecution. Manuel asks this
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court to reconsider Newsome but offers no
compelling reason to do so. We affirm.
Manuel alleged the following in connection
with his arrest on March 18, 2011 for
possession with intent to distribute ecstasy.
On that day he was a passenger in his car
being driven by his brother when they were
stopped for failing to signal. A police officer
detected an odor of burnt cannabis from
inside the car. Without warning, the officer
flung open the passenger's door and dragged
Manuel out. The officer pushed Manuel to
the ground, handcuffed him, and then
punched and kicked him. The officer then
patted down Manuel, and in one pocket found
a bottle of pills. The pills were then tested by
officers who had arrived at the scene, and
these officers falsified the results to show that
the pills were ecstasy. Based on these results,
Manuel was arrested. In grand jury
proceedings on March 31, the police
continued to lie about the test results.
But according to a lab report of April 1, 2011,
that Manuel submitted with his complaint,
the pills were not ecstasy. Yet Manuel was
arraigned on April 8, 2011, and not for more
than a month—until May 4, 2011—did the
Assistant State's Attorney seek dismissal of
the charges. Manuel was released the next
day. Because of his incarceration, Manuel
missed work and his college classes, forcing
him to drop courses he already paid for.
On April 10, 2013, Manuel sued the City of
Joliet and various City of Joliet police
officers alleging malicious prosecution
because of the falsified drug tests and other
civil rights claims that stemmed from his
arrest (unreasonable search and seizure,
excessive force, violation of due process
rights, conspiracy to deprive constitutional
rights, unreasonable detention, failure to
intervene, and denial of equal protection of
laws).

The court dismissed most of the § 1983
claims as time-barred because they fell
outside the two-year statute of limitations. As
for the malicious-prosecution claim—which
was not time-barred because the statute of
limitations did not begin tolling until May 4,
2011, when the underlying proceedings were
terminated in Manuel's favor—the court
treated it as barred under Newsome because
Illinois law provided an adequate remedy.
On appeal Manuel challenges only the
dismissal of his malicious-prosecution claim
and argues that the claim, as one in which the
police misrepresented evidence, fits into an
area of law that Newsome did not foreclose.
He invokes Johnson v. Saville, in which we
stated that “Newsome left open the possibility
of a Fourth Amendment claim against
officers who misrepresent evidence to
prosecutors.”
Newsome held that federal claims of
malicious prosecution are founded on the
right to due process, not the Fourth
Amendment, and thus there is no malicious
prosecution claim under federal law if, as
here, state law provides a similar cause of
action. Newsome did not preclude Fourth
Amendment claims generally, but we have
cautioned that “there is nothing but confusion
gained by calling [a] legal theory [brought
under the Fourth or any other amendment]
‘malicious prosecution.’ ” As the district
court noted, any Fourth Amendment claim
that Manuel might bring is time-barred.
Fourth Amendment claims are typically
“limited up to the point of arraignment,” after
which it becomes a malicious prosecution
claim. Thus if Manuel has a Fourth
Amendment claim not barred by Newsome, it
would have stemmed from his arrest on
March 18, 2011, which he would have had to
challenge within two years, but he did not sue
until April 10, 2013. And in any event,
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Manuel has no Fourth Amendment right to be
free from groundless prosecution.
Next Manuel argues that we should
reconsider our holding in Newsome and
recognize a federal claim for malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment
regardless of the available state remedy. By
his count, ten other circuits have recognized
federal malicious-prosecution claims under
the Fourth Amendment—assuming that the
plaintiff has been seized in the course of the
malicious prosecution.
Manuel does not provide a compelling reason
to overrule our precedent. As we stated in our
most recent endorsement of Newsome's
rationale: “When, after the arrest or seizure, a
person is not let go when he should be, the
Fourth Amendment gives way to the due
process clause as a basis for challenging his
detention.” While Manuel's counsel
advanced a strong argument, given the

position we have consistently taken in
upholding Newsome, Manuel's argument is
better left for the Supreme Court.
Manuel tries to distinguish Llovet on grounds
that he was arrested without probable cause
and incarcerated for seven weeks. Although
Llovet is largely about the theory of
“continuing
seizures”
and
thus
distinguishable from Manuel's facts, we said
in that case that “once detention by reason of
arrest turns into detention by reason of
arraignment ... the Fourth Amendment falls
out of the picture and the detainee's claim that
the detention is improper becomes a claim of
malicious prosecution violative of due
process.” Only if state law fails to provide an
adequate remedy can a plaintiff pursue a
federal due process claim for malicious
prosecution, and Illinois has an adequate
remedy.
AFFIRMED.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to hear Joliet police case”
Chicago Tribune
David Savage
January 15, 2016

The Supreme Court said Friday it would hear
a case involving allegations of police
misconduct in Joliet and decide whether a
person who was wrongly arrested can sue for
"malicious prosecution."

The case is likely to be argued in April and
decided by the end of June.

Elijah Manuel, who is black, says he was
stopped and pulled over in his car by white
police officers in Joliet. He said they used
racial slurs and arrested him because they
wrongly concluded that a bottle of vitamins
was illegal Ecstasy. He accused the officers
of lying.
He was booked in the county jail and held for
weeks after officers testified the pills were
illegal. A judge released him seven weeks
later because lab tests had shown the pills
were vitamins. But when Manuel sued Joliet
and its officers for a "malicious prosecution"
that violated his rights against "unreasonable
searches and seizures," a federal judge and
the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Chicago said he had no claim, even if all he
alleged was true. The high court voted to hear
his appeal in the case of Manuel vs. City of
Joliet.
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“Justices To Hear 4th Amendment Malicious Prosecution Case”
Law360
Carmen Germaine
January 19, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed
to consider whether an Illinois man can sue
under the Fourth Amendment for malicious
prosecution after being arrested and charged
on falsified evidence, taking up an issue that
has divided appellate courts.
The high court granted Elijah Manuel’s
petition for writ of certiorari after Manuel
argued that the Seventh Circuit is the only
federal appellate court to explicitly bar
plaintiffs
from
bringing
malicious
prosecution claims under the Fourth
Amendment if they are held in prison on false
charges or without probable cause even after
undergoing a legal process such as an
arraignment.
“In light of the deep divisions between the
Seventh Circuit and the 10 other circuits,
Manuel should be given an answer that is not
merely based upon a Seventh Circuit
precedent which has been repeatedly rejected
by the other circuits. We ask that this court
definitively provide him with an answer as to
the availability of a Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claim,” the petition
said.
Manuel filed his original lawsuit in April
2013 against the city of Joliet, Illinois, and
several police officers, alleging the officers
falsely arrested him in March 2011 on

charges of drug possession and intent to
distribute ecstasy. He was arraigned in April
2011, several days after a state police lab
report found that pills in Manuel’s possession
were not a controlled substance, and held in
prison until a prosecutor motioned in May to
dismiss the charges based on the lab report
results, according to Manuel’s petition.
Manuel filed his petition in April 2015, after
the Seventh Circuit in January affirmed an
Illinois federal court decision dismissing his
suit. The appellate court relied on a previous
ruling that plaintiffs can’t bring claims for
malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment if they have an adequate state
law remedy, finding that Manuel could have
sued under Illinois law.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged Manuel’s
argument that 10 other appellate courts have
affirmatively held that the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unlawful
seizure extends “through the pretrial period,”
even after an arraignment, but said that his
argument is “better left for the Supreme
Court.”
In his petition for writ of certiorari, Manuel
argued that the Seventh Circuit had
improperly interpreted the Supreme Court’s
1994 ruling in Albright v. Oliver, which held
in a plurality opinion that a man who was
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allegedly held without probable cause should
have brought his malicious prosecution
claims under the Fourth Amendment instead
of as due process claims.

he may have for malicious prosecution are
time-barred, whereas the Fourth Amendment
claims would be subject to a two-year statute
of limitations.

According to Manuel, the Seventh Circuit’s
holding is improperly based on a concurring
opinion in Albright that said individuals only
have Fourth Amendment claims if they don’t
have an adequate remedy under state law,
even though “an overwhelming majority” of
other appellate courts have found malicious
prosecution is a Fourth Amendment violation
regardless of what state law remedies are
available to the individual.

An attorney for Manuel, Stanley Bert
Eisenhammer
of
Hodges
Loizzi
Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP, told
Law360 Tuesday that the case is important as
a potential deterrent to police misconduct.

Manuel said in his petition that the case is
particularly important because malicious
prosecution claims allow greater damages
than claims of false arrest or false
imprisonment. False arrest claims last only
until the individual undergoes some legal
process, such as an arraignment, whereas
plaintiffs can sue for malicious prosecution
for damages from the entire pretrial period,
encompassing “a greater variety of injuries,”
Manuel said.
Manuel also argued that the case is the “ideal
vehicle” to address the circuit split because
his claim can “only succeed as a Fourth
Amendment claim” as any state-law claims

"The importance of this case is it will correct
a Seventh Circuit decision which is contrary
to the other circuits that will provide, if we
get the Seventh Circuit reversed, deterrents
from police misconduct when arresting
individuals and attempting to prosecute them
without providing appropriate evidence,"
Eisenhammer said.
Representatives for the city of Joliet did not
respond Tuesday to a request for comment.
Manuel is represented by Stanley Bert
Eisenhammer and Pamela E. Simaga of
Hodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn
LLP.
The City of Joliet is represented by Martin J.
Shanahan.
The case is Manuel v. City of Joliet et al., case
number 14-9496, in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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